

THE 'SECURITY DILEMMA' OF PAKISTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN: A REGIONAL TRILATERAL SOLUTION

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Abstract

Three inevitable realities instigate this study. Primarily, the goal of security in the region will most likely be accomplished just if as a minimum some level of cooperation is achieved between the major countries of the region. Second, Afghanistan cannot advance economically or enhance its security and administration independently without some cooperation from India and Pakistan. Third, although many strategists view the idea of Pak-India cooperation with distrust, there are many common grounds where both can gain considerable security, governance, and economic advantages. Most of the existing studies are focused on the assumptions that how peace in the region will come. First view is about involvement of USA and European countries (Western World) on one side and stake holders (Afghan Administration & Taliban) in Afghanistan on the other. Some believe in a trilateral pattern i.e. Western World, Afghan stake holders and Pakistan. Many also highlight the importance of support from neighboring countries like Iran, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), and China. This study highlights the significance of a trilateral (India, Pakistan and Afghanistan) solution in Afghanistan and the steps forward from this particular aspect. The possible answer to security dilemma of Pakistan in the context of Afghanistan is a solution within the region.

Keywords: Security dilemma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, trilateral cooperation

Introduction

The Afghan War, starting in 2001 was activated by the September 11 incident and comprised of three stages. The first stage was primarily aimed at overthrowing the 'Taliban' (the ultra-conservative political and religious group ruled Afghanistan and furnished a shelter to 'al-Qaeda', culprits of the 9/11 assaults). That stage was short, enduring only couple of months. The next stage, starting in the beginning of 2002 until 2008, was signified by modus operandi of overpowering the Taliban militarily and restoring the grounds of the state-building in Afghanistan. The third stage, a turn to be exceptional counter-insurgency regulation, started in 2008 and quickened with United States President Barack Obama's choice to expand the United States troop area in Afghanistan. The bigger power was utilized to execute a system of shielding the masses from Taliban assaults and supporting endeavors to amalgamate guerillas into Afghan culture. The process came together with a timetable for the extraction of the international military from Afghanistan; starting in 2011, defense obligations would be progressively given over to the Afghan armed forces and law enforcement agencies. The

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novel strategy was generally unsuccessful to accomplish its goals. Radical assaults and non-military personnel losses remained adamantly high, while a number of the Afghan military and police units assuming control of security responsibilities seemed, by all accounts, to be not well arranged to control the attacks by the Taliban. When the U.S and NATO combat assignment officially finished in December 2014, the thirteen years long Afghan War had turned into the longest combat ever fought by the U.S.

The conflict in Afghanistan must be considered in national, political, economic context and history of the region. Conventional Afghan literature is inclined to expose the country as a "terra-incognita" (The Tribal Land), "the house of war-lords", and the "cemetery of kingdoms". The present media study regarding Afghan political affairs adopts a cultural aspect, which overlook the socio-political environment and chronological background of events¹.

The combined Afghan invasion of United States and allied forces in 2001 was taken place after more than twenty years of fighting in Afghanistan. On 24th of December, 1979, Soviet forces crossed the "Amu River" into Afghan territory, apparently to re-establish order after an upset that instituted a couple of "Marxist-Leninist" political factions the "*Khalq Party*" and the "*Parcham Party*". However, the Soviets faced an across the country defiance by Islamist warriors, who won broad secret Pakistani, Saudi Arabian, and the U.S. sponsorship. The Afghan revolutionary battle against the USSR military prompted their withdrawal after 10 years. In the empty space, "civil war" ruled, with the "Islamist" contenders called the "*Mujahideen*" — engaging earliest to remove the Soviet-sponsored administration and after that rotating their weapons on one another. In 1996 the 'Taliban' took over the Kabul and founded an extreme translation of 'Islamic law' that, for instance, prohibited feminine schooling and recommended the 'cutting of hands', or even the death sentence, as discipline for insignificant wrongdoings. In 1997, 'al-Qaeda' pioneer 'Osama Bin Laden' was invited to Afghanistan (following the extraction by Sudanese Government) and made al-Qaeda's headquarters there. By means of al-Qaeda's facilitation, the 'Taliban' gain control of more than 95% of Afghanistan by the end of 2000. On 9th September, 2001 'al-Qaeda' assassin did the assassination of a well-known warlord named 'Ahmad Shah Masoud', who was leading the 'Northern Alliance' (a detached alliance of 'Mujahideen' that kept up control of a small area in the north of country) while it fought the 'Taliban' and who had disastrously looked for more significant United States assistance for his endeavor².

What is "Security Dilemma"?

The national security problem can be approached through concepts of security, power and peace. Researcher agree with Barry Buzan, who rightly observed that most of the literature in the field was, and to some extent still is, centered on the notions of power

¹. Sadr, Omar. 2014. Understanding War in Afghanistan: Politics, Culture and Social History. *Fairobserver* 360, No 1 (December).

http://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/understanding-war-in-afghanistan-politics-culture-and-social-history-65324 (accessed December 18, 2014).

². Khan, Riaz M. 1993. *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*. (Pakistan: Progressive Publisher).

and peace.³ Many writers who advocate this power-based approach are inspired from the realists like E. H. Carr and Morgenthau. The concept of power not only highlights the capabilities but a prime motive for the behavior of actors in the international system.

The advocates of the approach 'security through peace' are partially associated with the Idealist school of International Relations. Their chief argument is that this approach through peace not only makes them to see the problem of security as a whole, contrary to the inevitably 'fragmented view' of the Realist school of thought. Moreover, it concentrates directly on the needed issue of war. As the war is the main threat arising from the issue of national security, a solution to this problem would essentially eradicate the issue itself.

These two concepts of power and peace dominated approaches about the national security problem in past decades. These approaches sometimes led to extremely divided and contradictory recommendations to this problem. The notion of security played a secondary role in all of these discussions. The advocates of Realist school perceive security as a derivative of power. A state with adequate power would ultimately achieve security. This interpretation was easy to adopt when concept of power was defined in the very broad terms outlined by writers like Morgenthau.⁴ Although the concept of security as an objective was justly employed, but the view that power as means to achieve it was basically 'self-defeating'. On the contrary, the Idealist school viewed security as a result of peace and a long-lasting peace would ultimately provide security for all.

Arnold Wolfers' best known article can be described as an introduction to the multi-dimensional complications of the concept of national security. His characterize security as an "ambiguous symbol". He argues that it "may not have any precise meaning at all". This complexity highlighted by him would seem to have negative impact on development of concept of security as a major approach. This was definitely not his purpose as the principal theme of this paper was to highlight the potential ambiguities in this complex notion of national security.⁵

This paper embraces the meaning and "definition of the security dilemma" presented by Ken Booth and N. J. Wheeler in their book of "The Security Dilemma – Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World"⁶. The description of "security dilemma" by Booth and Wheeler emphasizes on the "dilemmas of interpretation" and reaction by the "policymakers", therefore outbound from the "classic definition" of the "security dilemma" that "focuses on the method of inexplicable security competition between defensive states". Here a possibility of misunderstanding ensuing from the employment of their explanation of the "security dilemma". So as to reduce misunderstanding, inside

³. Buzan, Barry. 2007. *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. (UK: European Consortium for Political Research). pp. 25-27.

⁴. Morgenthau, H. *The Problem of the National Interest. Politics in the Twentieth Century*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

⁵. Wolfers, Arnold. National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. s.l. : *Political Science Quarterly*, 1952, pp.483-485.

⁶. Booth, Ken and Nicholas Wheeler. 2008. *The Security Dilemma – Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

“this thesis”, the “security dilemma” talks about the “dilemmas of interpretation and response distinct by Booth and Wheeler”, except quotation from different intellectuals who have assumed the “classic definition of the security dilemma”. The typical description of the “security dilemma” is represented by “Booth and Wheeler” as the “security paradox”.

In 1950, John Herz brought in “the notion of the security dilemma into the International politics literature”⁷. He has pointed to a basic assemblage (in global political affairs), “one where a plurality of otherwise interrelated groups form definitive units of political life, that is, where groups exist together with each other without being converted into a superior unit”. Anywhere such “anarchic society” has continued living; there has surfaced what could be identified as the “security dilemma of individuals, groups, or their leaders”. Any grouping or persons existing in such a gathering ought to be, and generally are, worried about “their security from being attacked, subjected, conquered, or exterminated by other groups and individuals”. Endeavoring to achieve protection from such assault, “they are forced to obtain more power to escape the power of others”. This, thus, leaves the “others” more unstable and forces “them” to get ready for the most remarkably dreadful. “Since none can ever feel altogether secure in such a universe of contending units, power rivalry results, and the endless loop of security and force aggregation is on”⁸.

Later, with the “closing stages of the Cold War, there has been new argument over whether Gorbachev and the execution of ‘New Thinking’ established the aptitude of policymakers to understand the security qualms of their equivalent in other states, or what Booth and Wheeler termed as security dilemma sensibility”⁹. The scholastic discussion is demonstrated by a contrast of “offensive-realist, defensive-realist and constructivist” perceptions on the prospect of continuing “security cooperation” under anarchist state of affairs in global political interaction. The “offensive-realist” perception was emphasized by John Mearsheimer, who maintained that “insecurity among states in anarchism can never be lessened. The weaponry obtained by states for their own protection can also be used offensively, as armament of invasion”. Moreover, it is in no way “possible for states to take on military positions and armaments that hint their defensive objectives to one another”¹⁰. And for the “offensive-realist” perception, “policymakers” habitually opt to “worst-case judgment to understand the intentions of other states”. Provided that, “this reason functions on both sides of the relations, states always fear one another as probable security threats, and are thus always contending against one another to amplify their own security”. Even though “cooperation among states is achievable, in the long-term inappropriateness of their interests means that such measures can only be seen as short-term strategic tactics”. Likewise, W. Wohlforth contended that “Gorbachev’s execution of ‘New Thinking’ was a sensible tactic to

⁷. Herz, H. John. 1950. *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*. World Politics 12, No.2 (February): 140-157

⁸. *Ibid.*, 157-180.

⁹. Booth, Ken and Nicholas Wheeler. 2009. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics. *Ethics & International Affairs* 01, No. 23 (January): 82.

¹⁰. Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. (New York: W.W. Norton). 30-36.

reinforce the financial competitiveness of the Soviet Union for new security struggle in future”¹¹.

Pakistan’s Security Dilemma in Afghanistan

The planned withdrawal of allied military from Afghan territory in 2014 has caused huge uncertainties not only in Afghanistan but in regional countries as well. In India, there are apprehensions regarding an irresolute Afghanistan once more becoming source of destabilization and violence, which would have straight consequences for the Indian security interests in Afghanistan. New Delhi has shown great concern that Indian help in development of Afghanistan and aid pledge of more than two billion dollars, which has produced notable well-liked friendliness for the Indians, might not be adequate to continue the Indian commitment, its rebuilding and growth efforts in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of international forces. since the discussion “on the ‘draw down’ and ‘the future of Afghanistan gains momentum, whether India’s security, political, security interests may be sustained or maybe distended, could be a subject of growing importance within the strategic and political views circles in New Delhi”¹².

Significantly, Indian Afghan policy is an objective of its strategy towards Pakistan. It is vital for New Delhi that Islamabad shall not have influence in Kabul affairs. Traditionally officials in New Delhi have always tried to avert Islamabad from gaining any dominance in Afghanistan. “New Delhi has a desire to lessen Pakistani contribution in the Afghan political affairs and to make sure that a “fundamentalist” rule of the ‘Taliban’ does not emerge. Conversely, Islamabad has viewed Afghanistan as a counter-balance to Indian predominance in South Asia”¹³. Islamabad views better India–Afghanistan relations as disadvantageous to its “national security interests” as two countries border the both eastern and western sides of Pakistani territory. In the words of Haqqani “a friendly political excess in Kabul is viewed by Pakistan as essential to avoid the tactical situation of being caught between a powerful rival in India in the east and an irredentist Afghanistan who declares the ‘Pashtun’ subjected areas in the west as a part of its country”¹⁴.

Due to its “Pashtun” cultural connection with Afghans, Islamabad believes its position to be an advantaged one in the Afghan affairs. In the presence of these contradictory assumptions, both India and Pakistan have attempted to counterbalance the influence of each other in the Afghanistan affairs. “So far as their policy towards Afghanistan is concerned, both are trapped in a typical security dilemma.” Any Pakistani or Indian attempt, to enlarge its own safety, encourages the other to do something in reply, so

¹¹. Brooks, Stephen and William Wohlforth. 2000. Power, Globalization and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas. *International Security* 10, No. 25 (March): 113.

¹². D’Souza, Shanthie Mariet, 2014. India in Post 2014 Afghanistan: Challenges and opportunities. *Asian Century Institute* 12, No. 1 (December).

<http://www.asiancenturyinstitute.com/international/535-india-in-post-2014-afghanistan> (accessed December 12, 2014).

¹³. Weinbaum, Marvin G. 1991. Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship. *Asian Survey*.12, No 31 (June): 498–9.

¹⁴. Haqqani, Husain. 2005. *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 21-30.

providing a reason for worsening the general security situation of the region. A basic reason of the Pak-India security problems is “the state of uncertainty about each other’s intentions, a ‘dilemma of interpretation’ as a product of anarchy in international affairs”. As Waltz¹⁵ portrayed about fifty years before, “the system of international politics is manifested by an anarchical nature as a result of the nonexistence of a political power higher than sovereign states which could impose laws, resolve disputes and, in particular, offer transparency”. Herz¹⁶ recognized that “this social assemblage of groups of people or states missing a consistent governmental unity at higher level is creating a ‘security dilemma’ among them”. In anarchy, “the decision makers in one state cannot get entirely into the psyche of their counterpart for understanding of their intentions as intentions are impossible to control with complete assurance”. This generates a condition of ‘irresolvable uncertainty’. In the presence of antagonistic relations and an aggressive Indo-Pak history, “such insecurity may result into fear and worst case preparation - the irreducible dilemma produced by Hobbesian fear”. Therefore, the state of “anarchy in the international system” in along with the shadows of the past in India-Pakistan relationship leads for a full-size “security dilemma” among both countries.

With the intention to know the key Indo-Pak “security dilemma” problems, we should know the principal model of Pakistani security and strategy whose heredity rested within the plan of creation of Pakistan, which is “the Two-Nation Theory”. The approach which interprets once 1947 was a need of Pakistani nation and its government for equality with Indian counterparts, with the superfluous aspiration of evading any Indian resemblance in Pakistani character. The “ideology-based Pakistani identity” was fashioned to promote a character independent from the common Hindu-Muslim civilization and heritage in the Indian sub-continent, still additionally to contradict the supposed “existential danger from India”.

Momin Iftikhar¹⁷ rightly observed that “Concern and insecurity in relation to India is at the core of Pakistan’s foreign and security policies”. Indian threat is expounded each to concern of Indian capacity with its typical armed supremacy, with “no natural frontiers between India and Pakistan, however additionally to Indian intentions, an absence of trust and perceived Indian hegemonic ambitions”. In the beginning, Islamabad wanted classic military match. Afterwards in upcoming years, “nuclear deterrence” was observed because the nostrum. Still, the will isn't so easy deterrence except for an essential equality in the “nuclear arena”. Pakistan has continuously concerned about a strategic blockade – “the alleged pincer movement – that is the fear that at some point it might be encountered with a hostile India on the one border and a pro-India, anti-Pakistan Afghan government on the opposite”. Therefore Islamabad has “desired strategic depth in Afghanistan”.

¹⁵. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. (New York: Columbia University Press).

¹⁶. Hertz, J. Herman. 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. *World Politics* 14, No. 02 (January): 157-180.

¹⁷. Momin, Iftikhar. 2014. Relevance of Strategic Depth Scenarios. *The Nation*, October 17, 2011 also available at Aparna Pande, Pakistan’s Nightmare. 2014. *Friday Time* 14, No.4 (July): (India-Afghan ties reinforced the fear of a pincer movement), <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/pakistans-nightmare/>, also available at The India-Pakistan Security Dilemma: Major Issues and Charting a Viable Role for the United States, States. *The Atlantic Council of the United, Washington, D.C.* July 26, 2011.

Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan in addition to common regional and foreign policy, up to a certain level, based upon developments associated to potential US policy for the region. In keeping with the US and the majority of the worldwide community, Islamabad seems careful and choosy in its approach towards counter-terrorism. Partially due to Islamabad's evident disagreement with the existing Afghan administration that it believed as antagonistic. Critics of this policy believe that it is uncertain that how far Pakistan's dual strategy can last as it already needs a substantial degree of legitimacy. Prevalent mistrust about its readiness to engage in an effective counter-terrorism strategy has left Islamabad under massive demands to 'do more' by the US.

Prospects of Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Cooperation

Both New Delhi and Islamabad are fascinated about continuing their own political, economic, and security existence in Afghanistan. Here we would focus about prospects of "Afghanistan-India-Pakistan cooperation" for the stability in the region. Several Indian citizens at present are living and working in Afghanistan, and New Delhi is looking forward to use Afghanistan as a transit link connecting South and Central Asia. In the meantime, New Delhi assumes Afghanistan as a prospective basis of terrorism and view existence in Afghanistan as a measure to enhance its own security. Even though Afghanistan is relatively novel to New Delhi's "security priorities", it has long been essential to Islamabad's. Pakistan and Afghanistan have strong cultural linkage, together with "religion", "language", and the "Pashtun" traditions. Islamabad desires to preserve its security interests, suspecting that India might exercise its political and economic influence on its western frontiers and that "Afghanistan could again become a victim of civil war, and probably once again incoming of a large number of refugees into Pakistan"¹⁸.

Although the hopes for "tri-lateral" collaboration ought to be considered with some suspicion, the prospective benefits of contributing in "tri-lateral" cooperation are important for all three countries. The hazards allied with the illegal Afghan narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism expected to decrease. Mutual trade agreements between India and Pakistan would grant access to cheaper commodities, in addition to increased number of employments in both states, transit to Central Asian markets, and promote the public and private sectors. Amplified collaboration between the two countries would grant right to use the Central Asian energy reserves.

Policymakers and strategists in Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi gradually started to believe that more collaboration is crucial, while they differ on the level of such collaboration efforts, some support cooperation at the executive-level contrary to the ambassadorial level while some favor tangible "resolutions to the issues like Sir-Creek and Jammu and Kashmir and to the difference over natural resources of water"¹⁹.

¹⁸. Sial, Safdar. 2011. Pak-Afghan Relations: Emerging Trends and Future Prospects, *Islamabad Pak Institute for Peace Studies* 22, No. 2 (July). san-pips.com/download.php?f=164.pdf (accessed January-March, 2011).

¹⁹. Gundu, Raja Karthikeya and Teresita C. Schaffer. India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports, *South Asia Monitor* 25, No. 1 (April) <http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/sam117.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2011).

Opportunities of Trilateral Cooperation

Due to the Indian role in the economic system and development of Afghanistan, it may possibly be impracticable to anticipate that Kabul would formulate the equivalent policies for both Pakistan and India, but those policies can be objective and translucent. Nevertheless, as we discussed previously, many opportunities are available for trilateral cooperation that would be advantageous to all three states. Of all the opportunities acknowledged here in this part of chapter, the hopeful opportunities of cooperation between India and Pakistan are related to trade and "people-to-people" relationships. These also characterize the "pre-1947" models of cooperation between the two states. After the withdrawal of foreign troops, strategic apprehensions are still most important in Afghanistan; other strategies like "economic, trade, and energy", are subjective to these primary concerns.

Efforts by the Delhi Policy Group: The "Trialogue"

In 2009, The Delhi Policy Group started a "Trialogue" between "Afghanistan, Pakistan and India"²⁰. As a unique effort, the "Trialogue" assembled forty strategists, intellectuals and Track-II diplomats from three countries, to sort out what they could do together or bilaterally, to stimulate the stuck peace process.

In 2009, two sittings of the "Trialogue" were held, while three were held in the subsequent year. Various tangible proposals surfaced from these five sittings, in which approximately two hundred people from the Afghanistan, Pakistan and India have now taken part, for action at both the governmental and non-governmental level. Some of the proposals are short term and others require medium or long term actions.

The "Trialogue" recommends commencement of discussions for a regional prosperity. Broad agenda meetings for regional stabilization and security are necessary, involving states like "India, Pakistan, Iran, Republic of China and Russian Federation, as well as neighboring Central Asian Republics (CARs)". However, there are chances that a diversity of regional efforts can complex the situation, but if they synchronize "their efforts with each other and with the Afghanistan, they can promote consensus in the region".

The "Trialogue" also proposed a regional-discussion-forum to spot the main origins of terrorism. That "regional-discussion-forum" (like SAARC) would also sort out the genesis of supporting terrorist organizations. It has been emphasized during the "Trialogue" that terrorism should be dealt with and discussed honestly; or else further "confidence building measures" (CBMs) would remain ineffective.

Existing agreements of non-intervention and sovereignty like "Geneva Accords" and the "Bonn Agreement", should be further developed and executed, as they comprised promises of non-intervention and respect for Afghan sovereignty. The Kabul should seek assistance from UNO to implement those promises, giving UNO the power to

²⁰. Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Trialogue.2010. (New Delhi: The Peace & Conflict Program, Delhi Policy Group).

execute the applicable provisions of these agreements as a role of UNO in reaching a regional accord for Afghanistan is already given in “Geneva Accords and the Bonn Agreement”. That Pakistan and India should support the reintegration and reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The proposal of a ‘Taliban’ office for dialogue in a third country is excellent as it will help to make clear that whether the ‘Taliban’ can be a dialogue collaborator or not. The earliest possible repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan is also highlighted by The “Trialogue”. The use of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan for support of terrorists groups in Afghanistan is growing. Some of these camps have become heaven for the ‘Taliban’. The refugee camp in the area of “Pir-Ali” had been used as a training hub for the ‘Taliban’. The Islamabad has repeatedly demanded the Afghan administration to arrange for earliest possible repatriation so that these camps can be ceased to exist.

India and Pakistan should contribute in “capacity-building” in Afghanistan. “Capacity-building” is relatively a safe and “non-controversial” area where both countries can work together on joint projects. For example, Afghanistan may seek assistance from Pakistan in the sectors like training in primary education, even as take benefits from India in higher education training sector. Trilateral ventures in education sector can be started under the umbrella of SAARC Social Charter. The “Trialogue” also highlighted the importance of Afghanistan-oriented Indo-Pak talks. Several above mentioned proposals can easily be implemented through an Indo-Pak dialogue, in which both states can explain their reservations about each other’s concerns in Afghanistan.

The “Trialogue” emphasized on “empowerment of women”. All three countries have strong women’s organizations those are already functioning collectively. Afghanistan, Pakistan and India experience severe safety related fears for women, and each country should support reforms giving women enhanced opportunities. If Afghanistan were to set up “National Commission on Women” like India and Pakistan have, then all three countries could contribute to best practices on reform.

Economic development is also an important area which provides opportunity to all three countries for collaboration. Well-timed execution of agreements like “SAFTA” could add to trade and industrial recovery in Afghanistan. Islamabad and New Delhi also need to go forward on concluding an Indo-Pak transit trade agreement as an equivalent of “Af-Pak Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)”. Afghanistan, Pakistan and India can be also benefited from the idea of Afghanistan as a “Silk Route hub”²¹.

The electronic media in India and Pakistan is somewhat irresponsible, as it aggravates the antagonism and doubts. It is therefore recommended that the Indian and Pakistani media should think about education in conflict and peace reporting.

Conclusions

Even though “peace and stability in the region” will require key transformations, any decision of issue of the Durand Line, diminution of Indo-Pak apprehensions (particularly regarding Kashmir problem), and larger collaboration on political violence,

²¹. Vivek, Harsh. 2006. *SAFTA India-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trade*, (Mumbai: India Development Foundation).

some opening efforts for larger “tri-lateral” commitment could assist in formation of a more favorable background for prospect peace. Peace in the region will expectedly involve dynamic support from neighboring countries like Iran, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), and China. This thesis highlights the significance of a trilateral (India, Pakistan and Afghanistan) solution in Afghanistan and “the steps forward from this particular aspect”. However, that solution requires an in detail analysis of its own.

Many strategists believe that the U.S. must look for a regional resolution for the Afghan issue. Although some policy analysts in Pakistan have argued that there is not much the U.S. can do further than indirectly promoting cooperation, others believed that it could do a bigger job in resolution of the Kashmir problem. Still, some policy analysts in both Islamabad and New Delhi felt that the Kashmir issue still ought to be alienated from Afghan issue. In any case, the role of United States remains restricted until both India and Pakistan themselves progress in the direction of better cooperation. The foundation for improved cooperation currently exists. The “peace process” is ongoing; there is almost no danger of a major border conflict, and an understanding regarding “nuclear deterrence has now been established”. We might say about Indo-Pak relations that the glass is half-full.

In this situation, together with the “need to manage interaction with both states, the Washington should support existing mutual Indo-Pak and regional initiatives”, for instance the “Istanbul Protocol”, which are directed and owned by the regional states. Still, the current regional dealings and trilateral proposals are dependent on Indo-Pak political willpower and dedication. Subsequent Indo-Pak collaboration mutually and in regional system, “there will be more openings for the Washington to connect with the three states in different ways”²².

²². Arsu, Sebnem. 2014. *Afghanistan Consults Neighbors on Security*. *New York Times* 06, No. 2 (December). <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/world/asia/afghanistan-and-nearby-nations-adopt-istanbul-protocol.html> (accessed December 12, 2014).

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