

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS OF PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1947-58

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Abstract

The military is an independent political player in Pakistan. The armed forces are more organized than most of civilian institution and are characterized by their centralization, hierarchy, discipline and inter-communication. After the creation of Pakistan the newly born state was faced with numerous problems. In such a difficult situation, the military proceeded with full determination to face the challenges. On the other hand, political leaders were so busy with their power politics that they hardly had time to enforce the civil supremacy. Similarly, politicians failed in solving problems. Army supported any government determined to maintain law and order situation. Thus their influence increased in the non-professional fields. They run the civil administration directly. From the very inception military played a key role in national politics. Ultimately they became the policy makers of Pakistan under the cover of martial law.

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Although Pakistan was founded a democratic state, the word democracy has been challenging since the creation of Pakistan. Democracy has failed to make its roots even after independence. Pakistan politics is based on Personalities instead of parties and principles. Time and again military intervened in politics. For this reason democratic value could not germinate here. The article undertakes a comprehensive study of the role of military in Pakistan's politics. It has three parts. The first part is discussing Quaid-i-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan's point of view about armed forces and their responsibilities. The second part is about the political turmoil among the politicians. The third part deals with Ayub Khan's longest tenure as chief of the army staff and his role in national politics.

Indian sub continent remained under the British rule till 1947. The Indian Armed Forces did not take part in the struggle for the independence. The British Government kept the political leaders away from the armed forces. It did not let the political influences significantly undermine professionalism in the military. The military and the security affairs were the exclusive preserve of the British. They kept these matters insulated from political influences by denying powers to Indian legislature over the military and the defence expenditure. No Indian held the defense portfolio in the Viceroy's Executive Council until September 1946. The preference for the martial races for recruitment also kept the army free of the strong influence of Indian political leaders as these regions had a favorable disposition towards British.

Pakistan inherited comparatively less organized armed forces. There was greater shortage of commissioned officers in Pakistan than in India. The Muslim officers particularly lacked staff experience. That was the reason that Pakistan retained a larger number of British officers and, as compared to India. It took a longer period of time to nationalize her armed forces. However, it must be made clear that the Army remained sub-ordinate to civil administration during the last days of British Raj. The British Indian government decided to set up a special army command as the Punjab Boundary Force (PBF) from 1 August 1947, for maintaining peace and security in the districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhpura, Lahore, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, etc. This special command was disbanded on 2 September and the task of maintaining law and order in these districts was handed over to the new governments of India and Pakistan.¹

The government of Pakistan handed over this task to the Army. Its personnel provided protection to refugee convoy moving across the frontier, and undertook relief work in refugee camps by providing food, clothing and medical care in collaboration with the civil administration. Heavy rains and floods in the autumn created additional problems. Army engineers and other personnel were brought in for rescue and relief operations and restoring communications. The Navy moved some refugees from Bombay by sea; the Air Force performed some support duties for refugee movements and relief operations during the floods. This was the first civic mission the military undertook in Pakistan at a time when the three services were themselves undergoing the process of partition and reorganization and many personnel had lost family members in the communal agitation

¹ Hassan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947 -1997*, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000, p.52

that accompanied the establishment of the state. However, the army remained subordinate to the civil- administration in performing these civic duties.²

It was August 14 1947, Governor General, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, hosted a large reception in the lawn of Governor House Karachi. In conversation to some military officers he introduced his policy saying.

Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people and you do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.³

On another occasion when Quaid-i-Azam was visiting Staff College Quetta, he addressed to the officers on June 14, 1948, reminding the officers their oath said:

One thing more, I pleased to say this because during my talks with one or two very high ranking officers, I discovered that they did not know the implication of the oath taken by the troops of Pakistan off course an oath only a matter of form, what is more important is the true spirit and the heart but it is an important for and I would like to take the opportunity of reforming your memory by reading the prescribed oath. I solemnly affirm, in the presence of almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the constitution and the dominion of Pakistan and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in dominion of Pakistan force and go with in the terms of my endowment where ever I may be ordered by air land and sea and that I will observe and obey all commands of any offices set ever me: As I have just said now, the spirit is what really matters I should like you to study the constitution which is enforce in Pakistan at present and understand its true constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faith full to the constitution of the dominion. I want you remember and if you have time enough you should study the government of India act, as adopted for use in Pakistan, who is the governor general and therefore my command or orders that may come to you cannot come with put the sanction of the executive head. This is the legal position.⁴

The majorities of the army officers at the time of independence were either British or non Muslims and thus were not mostly available for the service in Pakistan. According to a source only 100 Muslims officers of the rank of the captained above in the British India opted for their services for Pakistan and none of them was the rank of colonel.

The military acquired multiple roles soon after the country's independence after 1947 as a result of the first war with India. The country's policy making elite tends to define threats to national security mainly in terms of the perceived peril from New Delhi. This first war with neighboring state in 1947-48 established the primacy of the national

² Fazal moqeen khan *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership*. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1973, p.6

³ Please see website <<http://m-a-jinnah.blogspot.com/2010/03/quotes.html>>

⁴ Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics*. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983, p.33

security agenda. From then onwards, military security was given maximum priority, resulting in the government allocating about 70 percent of the estimated budget in the first year for defence. The Indian threat had an immediate effect in making the military more prominent than all other domestic players. This development was accompanied by lax control of the management of the armed forces by the civilian leadership. Muhammad Ali Jinnah could not even enforce his decision to deploy troops in Kashmir. General Gracy, the Pakistan army's commander in chief, expressed a reluctance to obey Jinnah during 1947-48 war for which he was not admonished. However, military did not resist its orders, but Jinnah was convinced to change his earlier decision to deploy troops in Kashmir by General Achenleck, the joint commander in chief for India and Pakistan.⁵

Perhaps more importantly, the military also tends to see internal security issues and domestic political crises as extension of the larger external threat.⁶ The military gained prominence in the state apparatus soon after the country's birth, as a result of the first war with India. After the death of the founding father, Jinnah in 1948, Pakistani politics was riddled with the problem of factionalism. The political contest took place on three fronts.

- Amongst the various political groups for the control of the state
- Between the civil and the military bureaucracy and the political class
- Between the military and other dominant civilian actors.⁷

The hostile regional environs shaped the political leaders perspective on defence and security affairs. Most of them assigned a high priority to defence so that Pakistan could meet the challenges to its independence and territorial integrity.⁸

The sudden death of Quaid-i-Azam created a void which could not be filled. He was a firm believer in democracy. Had he lived, the democratic institutions would have grown and flourished under his patronage.⁹ "The death of the great leader less than thirteen months after the creation of Pakistan was not so shattering a blow as had been feared. There was a Joshua to succeed Moses"¹⁰

After independence, the most important functions of the new born state of Pakistan were to define the role of military forces, especially the army. For this purpose, in September 1947, the Pakistan Defence Council headed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali who was also Defence Minister of Pakistan defined the functions of the army, both the internal and external. The internal functions included to support the civil government and police in maintaining law and order, and to support the political authorities in the tribal region while ensuring that there were no tribal incursions into the hinterland. The external function of the army included the defence of Pakistan against foreign aggression. This

⁵ Aysha Siddaqa, *Military INC. Inside Pakistan's Military economy*, Karachi; Oxford University Press, 2009, p.63

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p.69

⁸ Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000, p.56

⁹ Safder Mehmood, *Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999*,

Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000, p.355

¹⁰ Hamid Yousaf, *Pakistan: A study of political Developments, 1947-97*, Lahore, Sange Meel Publication, p.43

was a big task for the army. Pakistan's geography made its borders difficult to defend. It shared 3,250 miles with India (1,250 in West Pakistan and the rest in East Pakistan, the latter of which was surrounded on three sides by India) and some 1,350 miles with Afghanistan. The Iranian border apparently did not figure in the calculus of defence at that time. And then there were the 450 miles of contested boundary in Kashmir.¹¹

As early as in 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan, the said, "the defence of the state is our foremost consideration. It dominates all other governmental activities". Speaking at a military parade in Dacca, he again reiterated that Pakistan had been achieved after "wading through rivers of blood that was a tremendous sacrifice and it should be enough to make you realize constantly, that, dearly as we won Pakistan it will cost us dearly to preserve it"¹²

External defence, however, could not be achieved without a modicum of internal stability. The bureaucratic intrusion into the nation's political life that followed the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan therefore was not expected. The army leaders watched as the bureaucrats attempted to bolster the failing Muslim League by assuming positions in the party and the federal cabinet. Power sharing between politicians and public officials, however, proved a hopeless exercise.¹³

Before the emergence of Pakistan, All India Muslim League had a lofty mission and a positive program. It rallied the Muslim masses and mobilized their energies for the achievement of their common goal. After the establishment of Pakistan, the league became the ruling party. Gradually it lost contact with the common man and got deeply involved in power politics. Since there was no leader or a common programme to keep the party united. It was soon divided into different factions.

Pakistan had seven prime ministers and eight cabinets during 1947-58. They belong to different political parties and bitterly criticized each other's policies but all of them attached equal importance to the maintenance of strong armed forces. After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin became the prime minister of Pakistan. In 1953 the military has become a major force in the body politic. Some of the major decisions taken by the Governor General were only possible with the support of the military. In the realm of security and defence, the military ruled supreme. General Ayub Khan the commander-in-chief, who had devoted himself to the modernization of the army, was the architect of Pakistan's military alliance with the US.

During his time the province of Punjab went in flames. The disturbances, which broke out spread fast and grew alarming. A political clash between the Punjab leadership and the central government of Nazimuddin cast its shadow over the whole country. It was not the political leadership but the defence secretary, Iskander Mirza, however, who decided to take a firm action with the support of the army to impose martial law in Lahore. It was

¹¹ Nawaz, Shuja. *Crossed Swords Pakistan Its Army, and the Wars Within*. Karachi:Oxford University Press, 2008, p 34

¹² Rizvi, *Military state and society, op.cit.*, p.56

¹³ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan at the crosscurrent of history*, Lahore, Vanguard pub,2004, p.71

against the background of the anti ahmadiya agitation which led to the imposition of martial law in Lahore, that Nazimuddin forced the resignation of the Punjab chief Minister, Mian Mumtaz Daulatana. In the ensuing political crises Nazimuddin was made to pay the price. In a cabinet meeting called by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, soon after martial law was lifted in Lahore in April 1953, he demanded the resignation of Nazimuddin and the other cabinet members. Upon Nazimuddin's refusal he was dismissed by Ghulam Muhammad.

“The price of the governor-generals' coup was high”. Three major conventions of cabinet government were destroyed or gravely weakened. First, the tradition of the impartiality of the Governor General was demolished. Second, the convention of cabinet and party solidarity was disregarded. Third, the role of the Legislature as the maker and sustainer of government was discarded. The action was aimed as much against the Assembly as against the Prime Minister.¹⁴ “A cabinet of talent,” as it was called, assumed the office. Muhammad Ali Bogra continued as the nominal Prime Minister on April 17, 1953. The main direction of the affairs of the country was however, placed in the hands of the administrators and the army. The Governor General had himself been a bureaucrat and had never made a secret of his contempt for the politicians and of his deep admiration for the vice regal system of government. Iskander Mirza was made the interior minister. The former head of the civil service, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, retained the portfolio of finance. The commander-in-chief of the Army, General Muhammad Ayub Khan became the defence minister.¹⁵

Ghulam Muhammad further undermined the foundations of the parliamentary system by dissolving the Constituent Assembly in October 1954. He dissolved the Constituent Assembly when it was about to finalize and approve a new constitution which would have stripped the head of the state of effective powers. This delayed the formulation of the constitution for another seventeen months. It seemed that the Governor General was unhappy with the Assembly because it had passed constitutional and legislative measures for restricting the powers of the governor-general in September-October 1954; he therefore, decided to get rid of the Assembly. This was a thoroughly unconstitutional step taken by the governor-general to protect his agenda of personalized rule. During the closing years of his life, Ghulam Muhammad was physically incapacitated due to prolonged illness, yet his lust for power did not diminish. He neither had regard for democratic values nor did he understand the parliamentary spirit. He endeavored to cling to power at any cost.¹⁶

The parliamentary system faced similar problems in the provinces. The dismissal of provincial governments and the frequent imposition of Governor Rule in the provinces did not leave scope for development of democratic traditions. There was too much interference of the central government in the affairs of the provinces. In West Pakistan, politics was a preserve of landlords who had secure constituencies. They were mostly ill-educated and had no interest in the welfare of the people. They were not loyal to any one

¹⁴ Ibid., 58

¹⁵ Ibid., 60

¹⁶ Ikram Rabbani, *Pakistan Affairs*, Lahore, Carvan publishers, 2000, pp.257, 325

party. Their only aim in life was to remain in power. Thus, there was ceaseless tussle for power among different groups. These feudal and Khans struck blow after blow at democracy and provided an unmistakable proof that feudalism and democracy could not coexist.

In the centre, Iskander Mirza, another bureaucrat with an army background, succeeded Ghulam Muhammad as Governor-General in 1955. He was also not better so as far as his attitude towards representative system of government was concerned. He was a strong advocate of 'Controlled Democracy for ensuring order and stability in the polity. It was therefore, not surprising that he flouted parliamentary conventions. He like his predecessor, tried to dominate and manipulate the political process. He was an expert of using secret influence and played one political factions against another. During his tenure (1955-58), the civil service attained great ascendancy and corruption, increased manifold. Again, it was mainly due to his efforts that the Republican Party¹⁷ emerged overnight as a rival to the Muslim League in the Centre and in West Pakistan. Mirza was determined to keep Dr. Khan Sahib in power as the chief Minister of West Pakistan despite his dubious political career. It cannot be doubted that the creation of Republican Party by Dr. Khan Sahib was a direct consequence of Iskandar Mirza's intrigue with the collaboration of the provincial governor Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmami. Strangely enough, the Republican Party was never tested in an election. It was the child of palace intrigue and remained in power with the blessings of the president who never hesitated to use unconstitutional means to support Dr Khan Sahib. The report of the Constitution Commission, instituted in 1960 by the former President Ayub Khan, also took the view that one of the reasons of the breakdown of the 1956 constitution was interference by the head of the state in the political process.¹⁸

If Bogra was a simple politician, Chaudri Muhammad Ali was a civil servant who became Prime Minister in October 1955 without any political pretensions. His elevation thus marked, in the words of the British High Commissioner, a 'deplorable' departure from the established parliamentary norms. It fell to Chaudhri Muhammad Ali to oversee the protracted negotiations which culminated in the approval of the Constitution Bill on 29 February 1956. When the new Islamic Republic of Pakistan came into existence shortly afterwards, Iskandar Mirza took the post of President as the Office wide-ranging executive.

The prospects for democratic stabilization had looked uncertain from the outset of the new constitution, given Muhammad Ali's reluctant approach to politics. The formation of an Awami League government in Dhaka in August 1956 was the immediate cause of his undermining. But his Republican Party, Muslim League and United Front government had been teetering on the brink of collapse for some time. Its demise in September 1956,

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Republican Party. Founded on 23 April, 1956 in Lahore by a group of politicians of west Pakistan who withdrew from the Muslim League. The group included by such as Dr Khan sahib, Malik Feroz Khan Noon, GMA Talpur, and SM Leghari supported one unit scheme. From 1956 to 1958 Republican Party was a member of several coalitions that came to power in Pakistan. (Hamid Khan, Constitutional and political History of Pakistan, Karachi, oxford pub:2010, p.117)

following Muhammad Ali's broke down which paved the way for the assumption of power of democracy's last best hope, the experienced Bengali predecessor as a National Leader. The responsibilities of office forced him into compromises which undermined his regional power base. This ultimately rendered him dispensable in the minds of the centrists in the bureaucracy.

Indicative of the tight rope which Suhrawardy had to walk was the vexed issue of separate versus joint electorates. His eventual compromise that in the western wing separate electorates should be implemented, but in the east, joint electorates could be operated and pleased no one except Mirza who had helped to pull the irons out of the fire for him. Suhrawardy's hold over his supporters in East Pakistan was further weakened by the hostility to the state pro-western foreign policy following the July 1956 Suez crisis.¹⁹ There were angry anti-British demonstrations in Dhaka and Karachi. Suhrawardy temporarily threatened to withdraw Pakistan from the Commonwealth in protest at the Anglo-French military intervention in Egypt. Emergency British diplomacy ensured that Mirza thwacked Suhrawardy back into line to the Premier's cost. The United States had of course by this time long replaced British influence. But hostility towards an albeit junior partner in the western alliance still perturbed the bureaucrat and military establishment which had seen Pakistan's pro-Western stance fill the coffers with \$500 million of military aid and \$750 million of economic aid by this juncture.

Suhrawardy's popularity with his East Pakistan constituency further dipped when he backed down over the Awami League's call for land reforms because of the resistance of the West Punjab rural elite. He was now in the dangerous business of disappointing friends and creating enemies. He evoked the ire of the western province's business class, for example, by having the temerity to tinker with the longstanding regional and economic imbalances in distributing the lion's share of American aid to East Pakistani industrialists. The West Pakistanis now decided that it was time to pull the carpet from under his feet. The withdrawal of Republican support from the coalition sealed Suhrawardy's fate and ushered in the phase of Chundrigar's two-month ministry. Brief though it was, Chundrigar stayed sufficiently long enough to further widen the gulf between the eastern and western wings by reversing Suhrawardy's decision on the allocation of the US \$10 million aid package.²⁰

The fall of Chundrigar's government in December 1957 ushered in the final ministry before the coup of the following October. The Republican coalition government led by the veteran West Punjab politician Firoz Khan was inherently unstable from the outset. The rivalries between Noon and his erstwhile Muslim League colleagues prevented cooperation between them despite the fact that they shared common landlord interests. The Byzantine going-on in Karachi was positively, gentlemanly compared to the bear-pit in Dhaka where the physical violence during a debate on 21 September 1958 resulted in

¹⁹ Rafiullah Shahab, *Fifty years of Pakistan*, Lahore, 1990, p.460

²⁰ On the nationalization of Suez canal Pakistan supported the British as Pakistan was her ally. The Muslims of the entire world criticized Pakistan policy and dubbed as the puppet of the west. In Pakistan also the people criticized the pro-western policy of the government and started anti-British demonstrations in Dhaka and Karachi. (Dr. Syed Salahuddin, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1998, p.48

the death of the Deputy Speaker Shahid Ali. This episode would not alone have guaranteed army intervention, but it occurred against a background of growing industrial unrest fuelled by inflation. Opposition parties noisily demanded early elections, while stridently lacing such calls with vituperative denunciations of the regime's pro-Western foreign policy. As early as 19 May 1958, Mirza and Ayub had separately conveyed their opinion to the US ambassador that 'only a dictatorship would work in Pakistan.'²¹ The whistle had to be blown before any democratic successes might be scored in the promised national elections. It was the end of the beginning of Pakistan's experiment with democracy.

General Muhammad Ayub Khan had been the commander in chief of the army since 1951. During the same period there was one Prime Minister in India but several chief of the army. During his period army played a key role in the major issues of the country. To make a strong army and to face the challenges a big portion of Pakistan's expenditure was spent on two types of activities of the armed forces. First, the day to day requirements of the armed forces. It included consolidation, reorganization and expansion of the army, the Navy and the Air Force and building of their reserves, the talking over of the control of the forces of various princely states which acceded to Pakistan, training exercises of the three services, an increase in the pay and allowances of the armed forces, weapons, the renovation of airfield and the purchase of defence stores, equipments, from abroad, to modernize the three services. Second, movements of troops from one place to another to meet the possible external threat or to maintain law and order in the country.²²

The role of the army in the non –military field can be divided into three categories.

- Help to fight natural calamities.
- Help to fight particular problems.
- Help to civil administration to maintain law and order.

Cyclones and floods often hit parts of Pakistan and these caused much havoc. The Army and the Air Force undertook rescue and relief operations, providing shelter, food, clothing and medical assistance to the afflicted people. Army engineers helped to restore means of transportation and communication including roads, bridges, and railway tracks and telephone lines. They also restored power supplies and repaired the collapsed embankments of canals and rivers. Useful assistance was provided for coping with other natural calamities including earthquakes, major landslides in the mountainous regions or heavy rains.

Interestingly, the nonprofessional role of army was ever-increasing in the first decade of independence. Specifically, the Army's assistance for coping with special problems included an anti locust drive in NWFP (1951), Sindh (1952) and Quetta (1954), which saved standing crops from the locust onslaught. In 1958, the Army conducted anti salinity and water logging operations in Sindh. Occasionally, the local administration sought the

²¹ Ibid.

²² Rizvi, *op.cit.* p.58

Army's cooperation in killing wild boars which caused serious damage to standing crops. Similarly, the Army conducted three major operations in East Pakistan during 1947-58 which effectively demonstrated its capability to carry out its assigned task to bail out civil administration in Pakistan. In 1952-3, the Army was asked to assist the civil administration in the 5-mile broad belt along East Pakistan's border with India for controlling the smuggling of jute. The Army launched 'Operation Close Door' to seal the border and to seize jute and any other items being smuggled into India. The second assignment was 'Operation Service First,' launched in 1956 to overcome the shortage of food and grain in parts of East Pakistan. Further, the G.O.C, East Pakistan, was appointed the Chief Food Administrator and was given sufficient powers to deal with all aspects of food supply. The officers and men took upon themselves the responsibility of managing and supervising the distributions of wheat, rice and other stuffs and they also cracked down on hoarders and black marketers. Thus, the Army rose to the occasion and proved the proof of its vitality and swiftly sealed the East Pakistan-India border and controlled smuggling.²³

In the realm of security and defence, the military ruled supreme. General Ayub Khan the commander-in-chief, who had devoted himself to the modernization of the army, was the architect of Pakistan's military alliance with the US. Faced with a hostile large neighbour, especially in the aftermath of the war in Kashmir in 1948. Pakistan had turned to the US for aid and military assistance though initial efforts were not successful. In the fifties the US adopted a policy of containment and of building a 'cordon sanitaria' around the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe. Although the US had its own objectives, Pakistan viewed its admission to the US sponsored military pacts, SEATO and CENTO as a guarantee of a US role in the preservation of its independence and security. The negotiations of military alliances were conducted by Ayub instead of civil government.²⁴

It was not until 1957 that the army high command started thinking in terms of overthrowing the civil government in order to put an end to political malpractices. There were two instances which indicated that General Ayub Khan had realized that the army might have to assume power in the country. He toured both East and West Pakistan extensively in 1957 and met the officers and men of the army. Second during Ayub's tour to East Pakistan, Major General Umrao Khan (G.O.C East Pakistan) arranged interviews with several political and local leaders to give him first hand information about the political situation. General Ayub Khan was reported to have said "if the people want me, I shall not shirk my duty."²⁵

As early as 19 May 1958, Iskander Mirza, the then president of Pakistan and Ayub Khan had separately conveyed their opinion to the US ambassador that 'only a dictatorship would work in Pakistan. The whistle had to be blown before any democratic successes might be scored in the promised national elections. It was the end of the beginning of Pakistan's experiment with democracy.

²³ Ibid., pp.72-73

²⁴ Hamid Yousaf, *op. cit.*, p.53

²⁵ Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p.82

Faced with widespread lawlessness and corruption, President Mirza declared Martial Law on October 7, 1958, abrogated the Constitution of 1956, and cancelled the January 1959 scheduled elections. He appointed General Ayub Khan, the commander in chief of the Pakistani army who had succeeded General Douglas Gracey in 1951, as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Iskander Mirza blamed the imposition of martial law on the political adventurers, the smugglers, the black marketers, the hoarders' who were flourishing at the cost of the common man. As always happens in power politics, power struggle erupted between Ayub and Mirza and within twenty days Mirza was forced by Ayub Khan to turn over the reins of power to him in return for his exile to Britain. Soon after the military coup of 1958, Ayub declared that the "Main object of the military rule was to return the country to sanity".²⁶

The vacuum had to be filled in consonance with the laws of nature. The Army moved in on a very good logic. Political instability was affecting the integrity of the Army and hence the defence of the nation was jeopardized. The situation became so tense that the commander in chief General Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law and thus the political system of Pakistan faced with a chain of crisis.

²⁶ Pervez Iqbal Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002, p.136