

URBAN GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY OF KARACHI CITY

Sobia Shahzad*

Abstract

Karachi is the 5th largest city of the world. Karachi is the victim of lack of urban planning and illegal subdivision of government land. Community-based migration, industrialization and mismanaged rehabilitation precipitated two damaging outcomes: unplanned urban sprawl and heterogeneous ethnic clustering. This study provides a critical analysis of urban planning in Karachi and examines social change in the city. It attempts to trace the growth patterns of Karachi city and attempts to explain its development through formal and informal sectors. This study is based on original documents and field research findings done by a number of national and international scholars. Government documents, departmental studies, surveys, UNDP reports, field researches are consulted. To understand the social transformation, sociological theories of population and specially migration are used in this research.

* Sobia Anis Shehzad, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan

Growth of the City

The city of Karachi, once the capital of Pakistan, is today the capital of the province of Sindh located at the coast of Arabian Sea. It is also the only port city of Pakistan as well as the largest city of Pakistan in terms of population and physical size. It is estimated to have a population of 11 million, accounts for 8.6 per cent of the total population of the country and 27 percent of the total urban area of the country¹. The city has grown at a phenomenal rate of 4.8 percent per year over the last 50 years, which by far outweighs the country's growth rate of 2.9 percent.

Table 1 Karachi's Population Growth

Year	Population	Average Annual Growth Rate
1941	435, 887	3.70
1951	1,137, 667	11.50
1961	2,044, 044	6.05
1972	3, 606, 746	5.00
1981	5, 437, 984	4.95
1998	9, 802, 134	3.52

Source: Government of Pakistan Census Reports, 1998

Karachi contributes 25 percent of the federal revenues and 15 percent of the gross domestic product of Pakistan. The city has 50 percent of country's bank deposits and 72 percent of all issued capital². These statistics underline the economic significance of Karachi³. Its multi-ethnic demographic structure serves in the growth of economy and also a potential source of conflict among communities. According to the 1981 census, 54.3 per cent of the population of this city spoke Urdu, 13.6 per cent Punjabi, 8.7 per cent Pushto, 6.3 per cent Sindhi and 4.4 per cent Balochi as their mother tongue⁴. At the time of independence in 1947 the population of Karachi was 450,000 of which 61.2 percent was Sindhi-speaking, and 6.3 per cent was Urdu speaking. Because of the influx of 600,000 refugees from India a massive demographic change was initiated that continued at an increasing pace. Within a period of four years, by the year 1951, Sindhi-speaking population was reduced to 8.6 percent of the total population of the city while Urdu-speaking population accounted for 50 percent of its population⁵.

¹ Government Census Report 1998,

² S. Akbar Zaidi, 'Democratic decentralization in Pakistan: A contradiction in terms?' Published in Naveed Ahmed Tahir (ed.), *The Problem of Good Governance* (Karachi: Area Study Center For Europe, University of Karachi, 1999) p.25.

³ Karachi has played major role in the political development in the country. Karachiats largely opposed the central forces in the country. They opposed Governor General Ghulam Muhammad's anti-democratic actions, supported Fatima Jinnah against Field Martial Mohammad Ayub Khan, voted for religious parties against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, stiffly resisted four alternatives governments of Bainazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.

⁴ Government of Pakistan Census Reports, 1981

⁵ Government of Pakistan Census Report, 1951

The sociology of Karachi has suffered with ethnic conflicts and unplanned developments that took place due to lack of provision of appropriately empowered institutions and authorities at city level⁶. The city, therefore, came to be afflicted with numerous problems in various policy and administrative areas⁷. In addition, the migration from India at the time of partition and in-country migration exerted unprecedented pressure beyond the city capacity and its resource. It was estimated that of the approximately 350, 000 new inhabitants in Karachi each year at least 150,000 were migrants. According to the 1981 census⁸ up to 80 per cent of Karachi's inhabitants older than 29 years were born outside the city. It was also estimated that of the 7 million inhabitants in currently about 2 million are squatters, living in one of the roughly 350 *katchi abadis* or *bastis* in the city⁹.

Urban growth towards north: The Greater Karachi Plan

Federal government established Karachi Improvement Trust¹⁰ (KIT) in 1950 and hired Swedish firm Merz Rendall Vatten (MRV) for the extension of Karachi. MRV planned the upgrading of the area around M.A Jinnah road which is now one of the main corridors between the suburbs of Karachi and its center. It marked the land for the University City, the federal secretariat and the legislative buildings. The plan also had a provision for ten-floor apartment blocks for the resettlement of refugees. It proposed a road network and mass transit rail system keeping in view the future expansion of the city. However, the MRV plan grossly miscalculated the population influx that the city shall have a population of 3 million by the year 2000 but the city had crossed this mark by the end of 1970¹¹. The MRV Plan's recommendation went largely unimplemented as it was unlikely that their implementation could have stalled the social tensions¹².

By 1953 the anti-government students' movement, supported by the poor and middleclass sections of the refugees, shook the city of Karachi¹³. The autocratic upper echelons in the federal government began to question the wisdom of the MRV plan that had placed the educational institutions and multi-storied quarters for the settlement of refugees so perilously close to the revenue nerve center of the administration.

⁶ Shahid Rizvi, *Local Government in Pakistan* (Karachi: Centre of research in local government, 1980)

⁷ Local institutions were non-existent. The municipal functions were reduced to the cleaning of the streets, garbage collection and some other primary function. The development and planning of the city and major policy areas like health, education, finance, urban economy, power etc were centralized and very occasionally involved the Karachi Municipal Corporation.

⁸ Population Census Organization, 1981 Census Report of Karachi Division: May 1984. Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

⁹ Frits Selier, *Family and Rural-Urban Migration in Pakistan: The Case of Karachi* (Amsterdam: Free University, Urban Research Working Papers 12, 1986) p.3.

¹⁰ Karachi Improvement Trust, Government of Pakistan Notification / Karachi/1950.

¹¹ See MRV Plan-1952

¹² MRV planned the educational institutions and university in the heart of the city that would have been taken from European cities. But the region of South Asia educational institutions and universities are politically charged and play active and violent role to political development. The Pakistan Movement was significantly activated by the students of Aligarh University in the Uttar Pradesh, in United India. So the university and other educational institutions' in the center of the city was not advisable specially in the eyes of bureaucrats who did not want such pressures and checks on their policies.

¹³ Daily Dawn, Karachi, April 26, 1953

To achieve consolidated planning for the development of the city Karachi Improvement Trust was upgraded to Karachi Development Authority (KDA) in 1957¹⁴. Soon thereafter General Ayub Khan took over the government and imposed Martial Law in the country in 1958 and shifted the capital to Islamabad¹⁵. General Ayub's government took two major decisions one was the shifting of capital and the other one was the removal of refugee colonies from the city center to the outskirts that began another phase of city expansion¹⁶.

Urban Sprawl during Ayub Khan

Greek company Dioxides Associate took the task of short-term plan for accommodating 119,000 homeless families and to develop housing for another 300,000 families over the next twenty years. It planned two new township, Korangi 15 miles away from the center of the city in the East¹⁷ and New Karachi, 20 miles in the North¹⁸. Both townships had a provision for large industrial areas in their vicinities aimed at creating employment opportunities close to the living quarters of the shifted populations thereby opening possibilities for a self-generating fast pace of development. In the first phase, 45,000 one-room nuclear houses with complete urban facilities were planned for these two colonies¹⁹. The plan, however, failed to meet the target and only 10,000 units were built until 1964. There were two obvious reasons for its failure: one, that the planned process of industrialization integral to its success did not take place simultaneously; secondly, the government failed to establish public transport system and the pre-requisite road network to the planned sites. Unavailability of employment within the locality and difficulties in commuting to their jobs in the center of the city encouraged, almost forced the residents to hit a retreat to the new squatter settlement in the city²⁰.

Greater Karachi Plan though failed to accomplish the task it was made to do, had profound impact on the future direction of growth in the city. If we look at the recommendations given in the Doxiadis' document on page number 24 in the original draft, it clearly establishes future developments of Karachi²¹. One major problem that emerged after this plan was the growth of katchi abadis. People who did not find the housing in the city developed squatter settlement along the narrow roads linking the city to the New Karachi and Korangi towns.

¹⁴ Presidential Order KDA Ordinance 1957, Gazette of Pakistan 1962, p.23.

¹⁵ Ayub Khan arguments, See Daily Dawn Justification of Capital shifting.

¹⁶ Doxiadis Associates- Consulting Engineers, Athens, Greece, The Drafting of the Pakistan Housing and Settlement Program, prepared for Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Rehabilitation. (Document—Dox-PA 1, 9/4/59)

¹⁷ Ibid, Dox—PA11, The Development of the Korangi Area, Projects PH 403, 1001, Periodical report No.5 (23/6/59)

¹⁸ Ibid, Dox-141 (26.10.61) The Northern Karachi Development Project PH-405, Periodical Report No.2

¹⁹ Ibid, Dox-PA 2, The Drafting of the Pakistan Housing and Settlements Program (9/4/59)

²⁰ P. Nientied, E. Meijer, J.v.d Linden, *Karachi Squatter Settlement Upgrading: Improvement and displacement?* (Amsterdam: Vrije University, 1982) pp.33-35., See also Arif Hasan, Understanding Karachi, op.cit. p.26.

²¹ Doxiadis Associates- Consulting Engineers, Athens, Greece, The Drafting of the Pakistan Housing and Settlement Program, prepared for Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Rehabilitation. (Document—Dox-PA 1, 9/4/59), p.24.

Katchi Abadis are located all over the city. With the expansion of city peripheral settlement have come in the center of the city. But this is continuous process and now Karachi has new peripheral boundaries where we can see number of Katchi Abadies and squatter settlement in new outer city.

Katchi Abadi residents felt some degree of security when the government provides certain facilities in their settlement. This ensures that government is not likely to demolish it soon. The residents start investing in the improvement of their homes.

This also marked the beginning of the informal sector in construction. This informal sector shall in due course of time become so strong that it would gradually take on the character of an actual Mafia in the city. Arif Hasan listed six categories of informal sector's activities. These were as follows²²:

- a) Unorganized invasions of private and public land: this form of development no longer takes place.
- b) Organized invasion of state land: this is of recent origin and though it has been attempted many times there are only 2 examples of its having succeeded.
- c) Illegal subdivisions on state land: this is the singular most extensive informal sector activity.
- d) Informal subdivisions of free-hold agricultural land.
- e) Encroachment on land developed by the KDA as part of its residential and commercial schemes.
- f) Encroachments on public parks, service roads and other open spaces in new KDA developed schemes in the city center
- g) Informal property transactions in settlements created by the government for shiftees from city center encroachments.

This period also showed a landmark increase in the *katchi abadis*²³. GKRPs decision to locate low income housing away from the rich city center also laid the foundation for the physical division of the city into rich and poor areas. Professor Linden, listed 250 Bastis in 1977, a process that was started in early 60s²⁴. With the passage of time Karachi emerged as a city of contrasts in economic, social, cultural and political aspects. Instead of reducing these contrasts, government agencies rather deliberately perpetuated these contrasts that exacerbated class segregation in Karachi²⁵.

Due to rapid industrialization and the Green Revolution the port activities also expanded several fold adding unprecedented burden on city's infrastructure and its management²⁶.

²² Arif Hasan, *The Informal Sector*, (unpublished), , Arif Hasan Associate, Karachi, p.1.

²³ Shahid Saleem, 'Land Management in the Katchi Abadis of Karachi', Paper presented at seminar on "Land for housing the poor: Towards positive action in Asian Cities, January 18-31, 1982. Saleem succinctly describes some aspects of the slums of Karachi and legislative supports of the program finance and cost recovery are examined.

²⁴ Jan Vander Linden, *The Bastis of Karachi: Types and Dynamics* (Amsterdam:Vrije universiteit, 1977) pp.110-113.

²⁵ E.A. Wahab, *The Tenant Market of Baldia Township*,(Amsterdam: Free University, 1984) p.5.

²⁶ Azimussan Haider, *History of Karachi Port* (Karachi: Karachi Port Trust, 1980) See annexure III,

The dilapidating buildings in old Karachi, close to the port, started to turn into warehouses, and the city roads were overcrowded with heavy cargo carrying vehicles for which they were largely inadequate. This increasing port activity and industrialization invited another wave of emigrants from up country. Karachi's population increased from 1.1 million in 1951 to 3.6 million in 1971. In 1968, the UNDP agreed to help the government of Pakistan and developed the Karachi Master Plan (KMP) 1974-85.

Urban Planning 1974-1985

Karachi Master Plan (KMP) was the first indigenous attempt to comprehend the problems of the city. This plan viewed the problems of Karachi more comprehensively than the plans mentioned earlier. It focused on integrated development with complete urban infrastructure that is housing, road network, transport, circular railway, and development of metrovilles. Land use plan was introduced for the first time, which identified areas of institutional development, recreation, environmental enhancement, and industrial growth.

KMP planned for 590,000 new houses for 1.5 million people living in squatter settlements. This plan launched three major programs of housing²⁷:

1. IRP, an Improvement and Regularization Program aimed at either upgrading or eradicating Katchi abadis.
2. OPD, the Open Plot Development schemes (similar to the plot ownership program) where residential plots are allotted to low- and moderate-income households.
3. UWD, utility wall development, is similar to the OPD, but it goes a bit further, providing each plot with a wet core.

Various support schemes were developed for microvillages that sought to provide technical advice, credit, and construction materials. Social facilities were extended in these microvillages.

KMP rightly focused on the transport problem and planned for the development of city bus system. Circular railways were extended up to new localities as a means of mass transit. In this regard, a number of bridges were proposed on Lyari River that would link various areas of Karachi. A commendable decision was taken to construct a Southern bypass to reduce the congestion inside the main city.

One feature of KMP's plan was its concept of cohesiveness for sustainable community development in the new areas. It set the direction of growth of the city in future. Present developments in certain areas of Karachi like Liaquatabad, NIPA Chowrangi, North Karachi, and Baldia were initially developed under this plan.

There can be little doubt that the KMP proposals were largely very sound²⁸. On the implementation level, however, except for the development of the road network,

²⁷ Dowall D., Karachi Land and Housing Study, Final Report, UNDP Project Pak/86/029, Karachi Master Plan 1986-2000, (Planning and Development Collaborative International (PADCO) & Pakistan Environmental and Architectural Consultants (PEPAC), 1989) p.206.

construction of bridges on the Lyari River, and a part of the southern bypass, other projects never materialized. The record of achievement between 1947 and the present is not very impressive. A number of review of KDA programs suggest that the lack of infrastructure, the capturing of plots by speculators, and the failure of the plots to reach the poor have led to the limited impact of the KDA's housing program²⁹. The KMP estimated that in 1972 there were more than 1.5 million low income people in Karachi (42 per cent of Karachi's population), out of which 800,000 lived in squatter colonies. The projections showed that by 1985 there would be an additional 590, 000 new households in Karachi, out of which 250,000 households would be from the low-income group³⁰. Now the emergence of katchi abadis had become an integral part of the landscape of Karachi, the KMP also had a component called the Katchi Abadi Improvement and Regularization Programme, which was meant to upgrade katchi abadis by providing urban services to them and by regularizing such settlements. However, this program failed miserably and managed to regularize about 18,000 out of an approximate 223,000 houses after having spent many hundred million rupees³¹. The plots were chalked out but the technical advice, credit and other social services necessary to their realization were never provided. The construction cost remained beyond the means of lower income groups despite large subsidies. Consequently, the schemes did not attract a large number of people who relented from giving the required level of response. The government, however, allowed medium-rise and high-rise apartment buildings, provided land at subsidized rates and the state institutions announced credit schemes for the development of apartments. This gave a new vista to the city filled with apartment buildings. One side effect of this policy was that the builders lobby became stronger and largely determined the government policies on housing and land development in Karachi³². The physical divide between rich and poor was further aggravated in the 70's with the construction of big bungalows and high-rise luxury apartment buildings in the west of the city along the Clifton beach. In the east of the city, the Steel Mill, the Export Promotion Zone and Port Qasim were constructed that called for more labor from upcountry to Karachi.

The beginning of 80s brought a new wave of migration in the city that had profound social, physical and political impact on the city's life. The Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Russian intervention in Afghanistan caused a major exodus of populations from these countries. The city was flooded over by 200,000 Iranian and Afghan refugees along with a sizeable number of Bengali emigrants that affected the social fabric of Karachi. Illegal drugs, Arms, crimes and first sectarian then ethnic violence erupted in the city that ruptured the social norms of the city. Karachi was turned into ethnic enclaves controlled by armed gangs, kidnappings for ransom, killings and other crimes. This situation led to the ghettoization of the wealthy class that further aggravated the physical division of the

²⁸ Shahid Saleem, Op. Cit. p.153.

²⁹ See, for example, J. W. Schoorl, J. Van der Linden, and Ks. Yap, *Between Basti Dwellers and Bureaucrats* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983)

³⁰ S. Akbar Zaidi, Institutions, Poverty, Politics: The Case of Karachi (unpublished), paper prepared for the Global Urban Research Initiative Workshop, Dhaka, Bangladesh, May 1997, p.10.

³¹ Arif Hasan, *Seven Reports on Housing, OPP-RTI*, 1992 Karachi

³² Arif Hasan, *The Informal Sector, Assessment and Review of Existing Conditions* (Karachi: Urban Land Management Study, Arif Hasan & Associates, Architects and Planning Consultants, n.d.) pp.2-10.

city into rich and poor areas. These problems continued to grow in the 1990s and left profound repercussions that are felt even today.

Due to the failure of development in the formal sector, the population of *katchi abadis* increased from 2 million in 1978 to 3.4 million in 1988³³. One of the major causes KMC identified was the sustained migration of people from rural to urban areas in search of employment opportunities and a better quality of life³⁴. The government chalked out a program for up gradation of *katchi abadis* that aimed at improving the infrastructure and amenities with minimum demolition of the existing structure. These included: provision of minimum supply of water; developments of roads and lanes; development of sewerage system; removal of solid waste; roadside electrification and gas connections; provision of civic amenities like schools and parks, etc³⁵. To respond to these grave problems of the city the Government of Pakistan sought assistance in 1988 from UNDP for Karachi Development Plan (KDP) 2000.

Karachi Master Plan: 1986-2000

This plan prepared as UNDP Project PAK/86/029 was submitted in 1991. By this time the builders mafia and the informal sectors and strong lobbies, well-connected with ruling political and military leadership, had become so entrenched that they shaped and even altered the decision making process. KDP 2000 ignored the informal sector³⁶ that had become by far the large provider of the services in Karachi during the eighties.

The Government did not include this sector in the planning under KDP2000 that reacted as a clientele group in the planning process. In addition to that the local government infrastructure and skills were inadequate and could not cope with the tasks under the KDP. The executing agencies and officials displayed a largely procrastinating approach towards the Plan. This is evident from the fact that the Chief Minister of the province of Sindh, who was the chairman of the steering committee of KDP, never convened the committee to approve the plan. The four democratically elected governments since 1988 did not pay urgent attention to this plan because of the then raging tension between political machinery of the central and provincial governments and ethnicization of decision-making process in Pakistan

KDA's Problems and Issues

KDA has been confronting with serious issues regarding the master planning of the city. Encroachments are one of them, which caused severe land loss to KDA thereby reducing its asset base and leading to eventual loss of revenue from plot sales. It upset the planning of KDA schemes. Where large tracts of land are available for development, pockets of *katchi abadis* prevent preparation of proper area planning. Formation of *katchi abadis* is

³³ Arif Hasan, *The Informal Sector*, Op. cit. p.23.

³⁴ Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission PC-1, *Katchi abadis improvement programme* (Unpublished) (Karachi: Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, January 1985) p.2.

³⁵ *Ibid.* p.7.

³⁶ Karachi Master Plan: 1986-2000, see the executive summary.

rampant and everywhere in Karachi. It is easy for encroachers to obtain court stay order, which make their removal difficult, time consuming, and causes legal and political problems for KDA³⁷. The government established separate department, Karachi Katchi Abadi Authority responsible for katchi abadis regularization³⁸. This authority from time to time announced a blanket amnesty for regularization of existing Katchi abadis. This has encouraged migration from rural areas and the rapid growth of Katchi abadis has contributed to the serious problems of over population in Karachi³⁹. Organized mafia who has strong links with government institutions patronized this process.

KDA's objective of providing public housing is not being met. There has been virtually no development work undertaken on any public housing scheme during the last 3 years. Principally this has been due to a shortage of funds. Schemes are supposed to be self-financing but the installment scheduling does not generate sufficient funds to cover costs⁴⁰. Unfortunately alternative funding from within KDA had not been available.

There are a number of significant problems concerning the development of schemes resulting in serious delays in completion, poor execution of schemes, lack of civic facilities and utility services and problems in transfer to KMC. Planning and urban design department and engineering department each have their separate inputs into scheme development but no internal responsibility is assigned within the agency for complete project management of schemes to ensure proper schemes execution, meeting of deadlines, completion and transfer⁴¹.

There has been a lack of effective planning and coordination with utility agencies—gas, electricity, water and sewerage, telephone and transportation to ensure that their services will be provided to schemes. KDA does not make any efforts to collaborate and obtain commitments from them to do so. In the absence of enabling legislation there is no obligation for either KDA or the agencies to make them available. As a result allottees of plots are discouraged from developing them. It is because of the lack of financial resources and effective management, poor planning and commitment to service provision, and lack of physical capacity to meet the demand⁴².

Karachi, at present, presents a picture of one of the most unplanned cities of the world. A colossal fifty per cent of its population still lives in squatter settlements without the basic facilities of clean water, power, education and sewerage. Internal migration continues mostly from rural areas. Governments since 1947 failed to comprehend the problem of

³⁷ Nientied and Linden, *Karachi Squatter Settlement Upgrading: Improvement and Displacement?* (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, 1982) pp. 33-38

³⁸ Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, PC 1 Katchi Abadis Improvement Programme, unpublished document, 1985

³⁹ Pakistan, *Appraisal of the Karachi Slum Improvement Project*, Urban Projects Department, January 14, 1977, (confidential) Report No. 1178-PAK

⁴⁰ Karachi Development Authority, *Follow-up-Action, Decisions of Governing Body [First to Seventh Meeting]*, unpublished.

⁴¹ Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, overview paper on Karachi, Pakistan, in *Regional Seminar on Mega Cities Management in Asia and the Pacific*, 24-30 October 1995, see chapter 3, priority problems and issues

⁴² "The Mathematics of Subdivision, Star Special Report, June 7, 1984, p.127.

internal migration that put severe pressure on cities resources and consequently the results of economic growth can not be seen on the surface.

In third world countries, cities are growing rapidly because of internal migration from rural to urban areas. The pertinent question may be asked regarding the migration of people within the country from rural to urban areas. We have taken interviews from men and women who recently (since 2002) settled in Jhuggis and illegal settlements. First we tried to find the causes of their immigration. Six categories of reasons were given:

1: Which factor is dominant in your migration? Table given below comprises the answers of the respondents.

Economic hardship 60%	Forced migration 15%	Natural disaster 5%	Conscious decision 5%	Social connection 12%	Seasonal migration 3%
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Pathans, Afghans, people from Saraiki belt, FATA, people from districts of Sindh Mirpurkhas, Thatta and Badin are found in majority in these settlements. This population provides cheap labor to informal sector in Karachi. They help in several activities but overall impact of their living causes serious problems to municipal activities and pressure comes on the tax payers. In other words these migrated people live on taxpayer's money and because of acute poverty result in other social problems like beggary, prostitution and addiction. They are soft target of mafia and gangs who use them in many criminal activities.

2: How did you know that this is your possible future destiny?

Friends & Family connections 47%	Unidentified brokers 25%	Government agencies 20%	Influential People 10%
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Responding to the question **how did you know that this place is your future destiny?** Overwhelming majority mentioned social connection, family and friends and interestingly unidentified brokers who gave assurance that nobody would ask you to leave. Our study found this category as main reason of demographic segregation on ethnic basis. Population segregation is a common phenomenon. Even in United States segregation of people into different neighborhoods on the basis of different social characteristics (such as ethnicity, occupation, or income) is common⁴³. But in Pakistan and especially in Karachi, ethnic segregation has played havoc to the city. Crowding of people has strained the city's resources. Packing people together into unsanitary houses in dirty localities cause diseases and death. Increased crime rate is believed to be linked with illegal settlement.

⁴³ Farley R (1976) "Components of suburban population growth". In B. Schwartz (ed.), *The Changing Face of the suburbs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

On the question whether living conditions are better than those in your home town, we received mixed responses. Those living in the outer city in remote barren lands away from the organized housing indicated their dissatisfaction on living conditions. They were of the opinion that earnings are much better but the condition of living is worst than their home town. Water, power, sanitation and proper shelter which could save them and their children from weather hardships are not available. Those who live within the organized housing on the empty plots are much happier than the above. They found more employment opportunities for men and women both as well as other urban facilities.

Q. 3: Would you like to go back to your home town? To this the answer is in the table below:

Yes, provided job opportunities and better conditions of life are provided there	20% mostly represents forced migration group
No, We are established here	60% mostly from conscious decision group
Still, don't know	20% not yet decided found in all categories of migration

Conclusion and Recommendation

There are obviously certain limits in designing policy of social control. Migration is found as one of the major causes of social change in Karachi. There cannot be any law that restricts migration from one place to the other. However we have a number of strategies through which we can turn this pattern into development strategies.

Findings of this study suggest two pronged strategies. One is at City level, and the other is national development strategy. Let us take the first one and examine the already existing literature on this policy.

City Level Strategy

It seems more effective in controlling the movement of people from rural areas to urban areas. This is an undoubted fact that their displacement is happened because of scarce economic opportunities in their towns and area.

Government should identify geographical zones of extreme poverty and design a long term development strategy and bring entrepreneurs in these zones. Such strategies would help in creating jobs in areas which eventually deter people to leave their places. Pakistan's development strategies do not seem holistic in nature. Urbanization and economic zone developed in uneven pattern. When we look at Punjab, urban centres and job boom occurred in north Punjab while South Punjab remained low in Federal development priority. In Sindh, Karachi and to some extent Hyderabad, is the main hub of employment pool and show economic growth, while rest of the cities of Sindh largely

neglected. And in NWFP, and Baluchistan the capitals of both provinces show some small and medium enterprise activities. This uneven development accelerates the process of internal migration from economically deprived areas to more lucrative urban centers.

Pakistan Planning Commission is the only federal institution who sets the development priorities and strategies. Its decision would have a profound impact on the future urban growth in Pakistan.