

HEIDEGGER'S DASEIN AS A DIALOGICAL SEIN IN-DER-WELT: A DIALOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Heidegger's notion of Human Reality as Being-there [Dasein] in Sein und Zeit develops in his conception of Authenticity of Sein-in-der-welt. Heidegger expounds the Being of Human self through the open-thrownness of Dasein in its world. For Heidegger Human subjectivity is ontologically prone to seek the Meaning and Truth of Being via authenticity. Dasein engages itself with the everyday world through idle talk, ambiguity and curiosity as the basic modes of fallenness. This way, Dasein loses its meaning and falls in the vagary of forgetfulness of Being. However, Heidegger would construct the relationship between Human existence and the Being through prescribing conscious transcendence towards Being in terms of Dasein's interior dialogue with its ownmost Self. On this interiority of authentic Dialogue [call of conscience], however, it is not clear why such a dialogue is indispensable to disclose the true meaning of Being. If we take this problem of dialogue as a point of departure from the inauthenticity, we may face the incongruity of Dasein's authentic transcendence towards Being and itself. In contrast to this, we observe that Dasein can only seek and understand the meaning and truth of Being via language, public discourse and **dialogue** with the other Dasein. Dasein involves its understanding of the Being through public discourse, somehow transformed in to the personal dialogue with itself. This implies that Heidegger's notion of authenticity of human existence involves a radical alterity of the self through interior dialogue [monologue]. Heidegger's this project has been widely discussed among various philosophers of Language. Our problem is to reconstruct Heidegger's Dasein as a dialogical sein in-der-welt. Since, Dasein is a being in the world and its understanding of the Sein und Welt can be established on the ground of dialogue with self and the others. Therefore, Heidegger's notion of Dasein is fundamentally a dialogical being in-the-world that needs to be construed through the nature of dialogue. This will further expose the fact of human reality in terms of Dasein and language is necessarily interconnected that one cannot be understood without the other. We have concluded that Heidegger has not seriously taken the question of Dasein's nature as being in the world that essentially possesses a dialogical structure rather than metaphysical one. This reconstruction of Heidegger's Dasein is intended to show that Dasein is essentially a dialogical sein in der welt constituted by language, meaning and public discourse in relation to social world of the-they-self.

Key words: Heidegger's Dasein, dialogical sein, human reality

Dialogical Dasein: An Introductory View

Heidegger's *disclosure* of *Dasein* as a *Being* in the world is characterized such as thrown *Being* in the world, and *Being* towards *death*. These are the essential aspects of *Dasein* to open itself in the world of *Being*. *Dasein* is in the state of *Being* when thrown

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in the complex structure of the world where he gets *realization* of his ownmost being as *existence* and *mineness*. And by realizing this he also knows that death is the inevitable *impossibility* of his *existence* in the world. *Dasein* comes to know all this through the *call of conscience*. Herein, *Dasein* is disclosed to be confronted with its own *Being* [self]. *The call of conscience*, here is taken in existential terms rather than *epistemological* one. As Vensus George writes:

For him, [for Heidegger] conscience does not pertain to the realm of knowledge, but to the realm of existence. It is existential, which belongs to Dasein in his concrete being-in-the-world. 1

Following this description of *Dasein* as being in the *world*, we have observed that Heidegger falls back in the vagary of *dualism* on the conception of *self* that he avoids throughout his philosophical outlook. While discussing the basic characteristics of *Dasein*, Heidegger somehow *missed* the points of all those *meanings* associated with them. *Dasein* derives these *meanings* from the *duality* inherent in the *Dasein* as *self* and the *other* at the same time. *Dasein* appears to be self and not-its-self [other] simultaneously. Indeed it is problematic to determine the *meaning of self* and its own other [alterity] all at once. This implies that *Dasein's ownmost individuality of its self* derives from the system of meaning in *language*. *Dasein* is the user of the *language*, he is *familiar* with the use of *language* and *meanings* [conventional and contextual] in the whole framework of *Rede* [discourse].

Dasein achieves all this through its *familiarity* with the common uses of *dialogue* at his disposal. In the realm of *dialogue* *Dasein* acts *intersubjectively* when the other reaches him to communicate *meaningful structures* by exploring their understanding of what they make meaningful in any of the *dialogical situation*. *Dasein* is unable to act intersubjectively with himself within his ownmost *Being* one's *self*. It is understandable that *Dasein* happens to a *communicative act* through reaching or letting the others to reach him in the *dialogical situation*. But the way he reaches the other or lets the other to reach him is possible through his participating in the particular spatio-temporal situation where they make *meaningful dialogues*. The *meaningful dialogues* occur between participants through their *familiarity* with the *Sprach und Rede in-der-welt*. And the *world* where *Dasein* dwells along with and alongside entities and other *Mit-Dasein* is full of *sociality*, *culturality* and *historicity*.

Dasein's individuality of his ownmost *self* is essentially directed towards the *others* in the *world*. But this situation is not the mere ground of *Dasein's being* involved with the *world* and *das Man* all the time, though most the time he is involved with the *world* of his *concern*. Nevertheless, *Dasein* frees itself from the influence of *das Man* and the *world* surrounding him. This is what *Dasein* turns towards his ownmost *being* his *self*. In this state of *Being*, *Dasein encounters* his ownmost *self* in a very simplistic way. For instance, in knowing the world *Dasein* is aware of his knowing the *world*. In doubting something, *Dasein* is absolutely *acquainted* with his own *Being* to doubt something. These meanings he acquires through monologue within his ownmost *Being*.

1 George Vensus, *Experience of Being: the Goal of Human Existence*. The Heideggerian Approach. The council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Printed in USA. 2000, p. 103.

Nevertheless when we observe closely *Dasein* in the state of *monologue* with itself, *Dasein* is encountered with its own other in itself. Though *monologue* itself must have *dialogical* ground on the basis of which *self* constructs *meanings* within itself immediately. The *call of conscience* appeals *Dasein* to free itself from the domination of *das Man* [the-They] and be back upon its ownmost self. However, Heidegger misses one essential point here such as the *monologue* contains *dual aspects* with it. On the one hand, in *monologue* *Dasein* speaks to itself, understands its *existence* and *mineness*. On the other hand, *Dasein* hears itself [the call of conscience]. This shows that *Dasein's self* is divided into two halves. One that *Dasein* is speaker as the *caller* calls or appeals to itself; two that *Dasein* is the listener while it *hearkens* the call of the caller within itself. In this way, *Dasein* is the same speaker and the same listener of the simultaneous [monologic] situation. So, *Dasein* as speaker and listener is one and the same Being. For Heidegger,

The call of conscience has the character of an appeal [Anruf] to *Dasein*, to be his own innermost potentiality for being. To this call there is the corresponding hearing and listening [by one and the same person]. [In order to] ... free itself from the self-forgetful giving of *Dasein* to the 'they' is to listen to the voice of his own conscience. [The call of conscience has the mode of discourse here].² Emphasis added.

Thus the *monological self* is split into two Being within one *self*. *Dasein* is split between speaker and listener in the *monological situation*. As we early described that the *monologue* is based on dialogue e.g. *public discourse*. *Monologue* is not a private aspect of *language* independent of *public language*, and it is necessarily grounded into public way of speaking and listening. Thus, *Dasein* is split between speaker and listener by the use of meaning, significance, language and discourse which all these are *public* by nature.

Now the question arises that who is speaker and listener? *Dasein* exists in the *world*, in relations to other *Dasein*, beings and entities in the world. *Dasein* as *in-der-welt-sein* is the *dialogical Being* rather than just a solitary one [purely isolated subjectivity]. So *Dasein* is a *dialogical Being* towards the other in the *world*. *Dasein* is *Mit-Dasein* when it involves itself in the common concerns of the *world* as *being-with* others. By the way of using public means e.g. *language* *Dasein* exports its understanding to the same others in the *world*.

Even Heidegger avoids using terminology of solitary and isolated pure subject pertaining to his ownmost *Being* [self]. *Dasein* [self of *Dasein*] is always using a public means of *communication* e.g. language and discourse *familiarly*. He is never a lonely subject or a detached and *antecedently individuated self*. Rather *Dasein* is being in the *world*, uses public way of discourse through his *dialogical subjectivity* directed to the *world*. Thus the *monological self* itself is *dialogical* at the first instance. *Das welt* provides the public way of thinking, doing and interpreting things [Mitseins], entities in the *world*. *Das welt* contains *das Man Selbst* which lets *Dasein* to be involved into the

² *Being and Time*, op cit. p. 314. Versus George. *Experience of Being and the Goal of Human Existence*. op cit. p. 104.

intersubjective dialogue. This way of *dialogue* is the pre-ground of the *monological self*. Thus *monological self* is the *dialogical self* indeed.

However, in *dialogue Dasein* entertains relations with *Mit-Dasein* [others]. He is involved in the common concerns intersubjectively. Where as in *monologue Dasein* is self-enclosed being towards itself. As being towards itself is *split* into same speaker and the same listener. Thus, *monologue* refers to the *call of conscience*, *anxiety* and *death* of *Dasein* mostly involves the duality of speaker and listener through the *public language* [the language is always public]. Thus, expression of one's *anxiety* and *death* through the *call of conscience* occurs through the *public language*. *Sprach* itself is the social product, it carries values in itself in a very public way and influences the individuals behavior by enculturating them in its *communal capacity*.

Dasein is authentic one's *self* only when he free himself from the dominance of *das Man*. He turns to be *inauthentic Being* only when he *distances* himself from his ownmost one's *self*. However, these both essential aspects of the *Being* of *Dasein* embody *dialogic mode* of understanding one's ownmost *self* as *Being possible*, and its relation to the *world* at large. By using the *dialogue Dasein* gets to the *state of mind* properly and then to *understanding* of what he is related to the *Being* of entities and *das Welt*. This understanding of *Dasein* depends upon the *public language* essentially in a dialogic manner. Primarily *language* are spoken first, then social participants construct the skeleton of *language* by inventing rules, principles and grammatical structures in practice. This *a-historic* perspective of *language is public* essentially. No any individual person is able to produce a private language different from the ones spoken in the social world of *Dasein*.

This implies that *Dasein's Being* is essentially social, and his subjectivity is essentially *dialogical* by way of being oriented towards *das Welt* via *meanings*, and *referential totality*. Heidegger has missed this essential aspect of *Dasein* to be *dialogical* in all its existential potentiality of *Being* one's *self*. For instance, the call of conscience is subjective but its way of expression is objective. The authentic *Dasein* hears the *call of conscience* in a way as he *hears* the *call* of any other *Dasein* in the external *dialogical situation*. A person calling for help demands or appeals to gains respond from the person who instantly encounters him or is near passerby. The other person who is actually called by first person participant must respond him responsibly. This *dialogical situation* is objective and *intersubjective* essentially. In contrast to this situation, *call of conscience* comes from within that may be called a *monological situation* rather *dialogical* one. But this situation itself depends upon the public way of expression e.g. *dialogue* occurring in the actual *world*. We have already described this situation. To repeat this here gives us a clue for relating being of authentic temporal *Dasein* to its subjective and objective situations all at once.

Hearkening the *call of conscience* is the *existential mode* of understanding for *Dasein*. And through understanding he interprets what is being appealed through the *call*. The *hermeneutic* way of hearing and understanding the call is existentially *phenomenological* dimension of *Dasein*. *Dasein* is always essentially oriented to hear, understand and respond the *call* of the caller within his own being.

As understanding Dasein projects its Being the projecting of understanding has its own possibility – that of developing itself This development ... is [called] an interpretation. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which [the call or appeal] is understood by it. [This interpretation occurs through Dasein's understanding the world already there and constituting the meanings beyond everyday world.]

However, and for the most part:

... the phenomenon of interpretation in understanding the world is inauthentic understanding [but the authentic understanding occurs through interpreting the call of the caller in an appropriate way e.g. Dasein is called upon its ownmost Being one's self] ... and indeed in the mode of its genuineness. [This way of understanding occurs authentically] 3 Emphasis added.

Dasein's understanding is indeed interpretation of what is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. *Dasein's mode of understanding primarily develops through the public way of interpreting things, entities and human relationships in the social world.* Herein for Habermass, humans act intersubjectively in the social world because each one tries to reach an understanding through communication on the basis of language. This philosophical approach shifts human subjectivity from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language. Thus understanding, consciousness, thinking, believing, trusting, desiring, feeling pain or pleasure etc are not mere mental acts but always dialogical acts in relations to the language as the referential totality. Through language all mental acts get expressed and understood via dialogue between participants.

So in this way, the call of conscience has a public ground of meanings through language. The language shapes and constitutes human subjectivity as the dialogical subjectivity. The dialogical subjectivity is always intentionally directed towards others and one's own being within [Dasein's own other]. This shows that *Dasein's subjectivity* [the call of conscience] is always dialogical and intentionally directional one.

2. Dialogicality of Self: Dasein as in-der-welt-sein

In the division 1 of the *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger describes the Being-there as an entity that asks the question of meaning and truth of Being as such. In this analytic, Heidegger mainly describes *Dasein* in terms of Being directed towards itself and entities other than itself in the world. This comes with the exposition of fundamental elements constituting *Dasein's intentional orientation* towards itself and the other. The subjectivity of *Dasein* is essentially directed towards itself and the world or everydayness. The world is the revealing place for *Dasein* to exist by dwelling in it meaningfully.

We will primarily illuminate the subjectivity which, indeed, shapes the entity of *Dasein* as in-der-welt. This will be done through hermeneutic understanding of Heidegger's text *Sein und Zeit*. We have gone through his thought in relations to the question, meaning and truth of Being in the course of his phenomenological methodology. By doing this, it

3 Vollmer Mueller Kurt. Eds. *The Hermeneutics Reader*. The Text of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present. Continuum Publishing Company. New York. 1985. p. 221

will be made clear to read subjectivity of *Dasein* intentionally directed towards itself, entities, *Mitsein* and *Mit Dasein* in the world. The *subjectivity* remains no more a disembodied subject in terms of isolated thinking substance. The intentionality structure of *Dasein's subjectivity* as being towards itself and the other is disclosed *phenomenologically* through various means such as *Befindlichkeit*, *Verstehen und Rede*.⁴ For Heidegger, these features are *equiprimordial* and constitutive ways of *Being*. He says:

... understanding [verstehen], and the state of mind/Being [Befindlichkeit] [are] are two constitutive ways of being "there"; these are equiprimordial. [Both] state of mind/Being and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by discourse [Rede]. By [his] very nature, Dasein is a being [of] its "there", [in this way], *Dasein is its disclosedness*.⁵

Heidegger associates these two features of *Dasein* through which *Dasein* realizes his being as *thrown existence* in the world and understands his own existence as an *issue* for it. Along with these *constitutive ways of being-there*, there are two main characteristics of *Dasein* on the basis of which his *being* is ontologically different from entities other than itself. Firstly, *Dasein's essence lies in its existence*. It means *Dasein's essence* is identical with its existence. Therefore, there is no possibility of detachment between the two. *Dasein's existence* constitutes its essence. Herein, Heidegger *departs* from the traditional position of *distinction* between essence and existence. In the *history of concept of Time*, Heidegger *blames* Husserl for bracketing out existence in the *transcendent* and *eidetic reduction* [suspension of naturalism], that directly *brackets* essences from existence. Heidegger thinks that philosophical tradition has *forgotten* the meaning of *Being* by *blurring* the relationships between *Being* and beings.⁶ Heidegger maintains that in essence/existence problematic one forgets the way *Dasein* is *ontologically* different from *Being* as such and entities *present-at-hand*. Through this exposition, Heidegger thinks that existence lies with human *Dasein* alone. So, *existence is not the property of entities which lack subjectivity* [entities lack the structure of thinking, desiring, being conscious of, or intentional towards itself or other than itself].

The second characteristic of *Dasein* is his *mineness*.⁷ Accordingly, *Dasein* is known to have relationship to its *Being* which is *identical* to it. This shows that *Dasein* is *personal Being* and cannot adapt a neutral position to its own being in the world.⁸ Both, *Dasein's existence* and *mineness* constitute the way *Dasein* is an issue⁹ for it, and that *Dasein's self* is oriented to its ownmost *Being*. Because *Dasein* ... "in each case is" ... its own being.¹⁰ As Heidegger says:

⁴ See, *Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Rede und Sprach* in *Being and Time*, op cit. pp. 175-182-203, see also William Richardson, William J. Fordham University Press. 2003, originally published in 1963. p. 64.

⁵ *Being and Time*, pp. 171-172.

⁶ Heidegger takes the turn towards this position particularly in his later works by criticizing the traditional distinction between essence and existence.

⁷ See *Jemeinigkeit* in *Being and Time*, p. 68.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 22.

⁹ See *Dasein* is an *issue* for itself. *Ibid*, op cit, pp. 68.

¹⁰ *Ibid* p. 68.

[Dasein is a being] ... [whose very Being] is an issue for [him], [and] is in each case [his] mine. [Dasein] ... comports [himself] towards his own Being as his own possibility. ... [and] exists in the manner of being-in-the-world ... [so, Dasein] exists for the sake of [his] own self – it is not the case that this being just simply is, instead, so far as, [he] is occupied with his own capacity to be ... in the world. 11

In this way, *Dasein's Being* is towards its *ownmost possibilities*, and therefore *Dasein* is its *eigenste Möglichkeit*. 12 *Dasein* intends its ownmost being possible and comports itself towards *other* as well. *Dasein* exercises its power to actualize its possibilities by *realizing* its own being as *Seinkönnen* [ability to-be]. However, this is the formal description of *Dasein's existential* structure. *Dasein* has *acquaintance* of its *Being* in a *prior* manner. Hereto *Dasein* has understanding of its ownmost being as an *intentional subject*. In other words, *Dasein's prior understanding* 13 of its being is tantamount to *Dasein's intentional subjectivity*.

Following this realm of argument, we observe that *Dasein's antecedent understanding* of itself carries *Seinsfrage* [question of meaning of Being], 14 in order to *ask questions* about its own being, *Being* in general and the *Being* of entities. This implies that *Dasein's* understanding of Being ensues from the way he encounters/comports with/to entities and *converses* with beings like him. This is what *Dasein's existential* structures rely upon the prior understanding of *Being*. As Heidegger maintains that:

[by raising the question of meaning of Being] ... is to reawaken an understanding for meaning of this question, [that is], this question has been forgotten. The question of meaning of Being must be formulated. If it is the fundamental question, it must be made transparent, and in an appropriate way. 15

This all depends upon Heidegger's *existential analytic of Dasein* whose existence is disclosed to not only question his own *Being* but the Being beyond beings. *Dasein* is a *Being* whose *self* [intentional subjectivity] settles with the *world* as an essential place where he realizes that this question must be revisited in order to achieve *meaning* and *truth* of the *Being* and wriggle the whole philosophy out of the *forgetfulness of Being*.

For this reason, we may go further to describe *intentional subjectivity* in terms of *Dasein* as in-sein *dwelling* in/with/besides the *world*. This *In-sein* pertains to *Dasein's dwelling* in the *world* meaningfully. This existentiality of *Dasein's existence* is an *intentional subjectivity* which directs *Dasein* not only towards the being in average everyday *world* in general but to *Dasein's ownmost being* in particular as well.

In this manner, *Dasein's existentiality* of its existence is an *intentional subjectivity* which is not a disembodied subject or antecedently individuated *self* prior to being/s other than itself. *Dasein* happens to the *world* by *dwelling* in it as *In-sein*. 'In' is the existential preposition which shows that *Dasein* is a being in the world. This being in

11 Ibid, pp. 68- 170.

12 Dasein is its ownmost possibility.

13 *Being and Time*, op cit. pp. 20-21.

14 See *Seinsfrage*, Question of Being, ibid, p. 20.

15 Ibid, p. 24

the *world* is not specifically bound by three geometrical spaces or distributed in the spans of time as do entities present-at-hand. This means *Dasein* is not an entity like present-at-hand. *Dasein* is being conscious of itself, of the other and understands its state of being thrown in the course of its being empowered with *discourse* [Rede]. It entails that *Dasein* is *familiar* and *involves* itself with the affairs of the *world* by dwelling in it.

In this state of *Being*, the *horizon* [pre-reflective understanding] of *intentional subjectivity* of *Dasein* occurs in the *world* of complexity. This *intentional subjectivity* directs *Dasein* towards its own other. This is the reason why, phenomenological ontology brings *subjectivity* back to the *world* by operating *intentional subjectivity* of being-there *in-der-welt*. While, traditional ontology failed to schematize *subjectivity* properly in order to segregate being of *intentionality* from the entities or things present-at-hand, phenomenological ontology is careful of making distinction between being of *intentionality* and that of entities or things present at hand. In this way, we observe *Dasein* is *in-sein in-der-welt sein* on the basis existential structure of *care*. *Sorge* is one of significant structure of *intentional subjectivity* of *Dasein*. *Sorge* 16 is the *existential structure* of *Dasein* to direct it to its ownmost being as an *issue* for it and involves with its own subjectivity. Therefore, "Dasein's Being reveals [himself] as *care* [Sorge]." 17 Heidegger, intends to refute any argument to regard *in-der-welt-sein* to relegate human situation to its *Umwelt* e.g. environment. Heidegger puts this as:

... there is much talk about 'man's' having an environment, but this says nothing ontologically as long as 'having' is left indefinite. In its very possibility this 'having' is founded upon the existential state of Being-in. ... Dasein is essentially an entity with Being-in, it can explicitly discover those entities which it encounters environmentally, it can know them, it can avail itself of them, it can have the world. 18

Following this argument we may observe the fact that *in-der-welt-sein* is typically construed in terms 'knowing the world'. This pertains to subject's relation to/with object. For how would subject go beyond its *subjectivity* [interiority] and reach an *understanding* with external object for the sake of knowing them in their being. We have gone through this notion in the paradigm of phenomenology that utterly *discourages* this view with idea of intentionality. If we observe this view further in Heidegger's stance through his phenomenological ontology, then this would be resolved fairly. For instance, Heidegger would describe the situation that epistemological model *fails* to construe the importance of *in der welt sein* in relation *Dasein's Being* always and already beside/alongside entities. Thus Heidegger would relegate *intentional subjectivity* directed to objects in the external *world*. In this way, *subject's exteriority* is established through *Being-there* in the *world*. 19 However, this being in the world does not apply to

16 *Sorge* is the meaning of *Dasein's in-der-welt-sein*. *Being and Time*, op cit. pp. 78-225.

17 Ibid, p. 227

18 Ibid. pp. 83-84.

19 This is what we regard in der welt in terms of world itself. However, the notion of welt should not be construed as meaning of entities which engulf the welt. Rather, welt must be understood in terms of worldhood of the world. There are four meanings of the world here. One; welt as ontical concept which bears totality of entities present-at-hand in der welt. Two; Welt is described as ontological concept signifying

all entities *equiprimordially*, because man is different from the tree, stone, atom, molecule or anything other than human beings.

For Heidegger:

[human being [Dasein] is only a being in the world in a way that he is] ... having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, make use of something, giving something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining all these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being [The world is wherein] ... Dasein lives.
20

Furthermore Heidegger believes that we cannot interpret world as bulk of entities existing in it, rather it is human world of *Dasein* as *Being-in-the-world*. For instance:

The world is not the sum total extent entities ... it is a determination of being-in-the-world, a moment in the structure of the Dasein's mode of being. 21

For Heidegger, subject and object are detached due to *bracketing* of our ordinary involvement/engagement with the *natural world* out there. *Bracketing* the *welt* [naturalism] would make it possible for subject to experience the transcendental aspect of consciousness e.g. *pure subjectivity*. Heidegger shifts from this *reductionism* [suspension of naturalism]. He turns towards the *intentional subjectivity* directed to *itself* and *other* than itself. So, Heidegger would find the way towards *intentional subjectivity* in order to eliminate the *distintiality* between subject and the object [other]. In Heidegger's *Dasein* we find *dialogical thinker* [intentional subject] who knows, thinks, desires, trusts, believes, feels pain and is conscious of these mental acts directed towards objects in the *external world*.

It follows that knowing or thinking does not occur in isolated *individuated subject*, but in the *intentional subject*. *Dasein* knows of something, and knowing is the possibility inherent in the *Being* of *Dasein* as *in-der-welt sein*. 22 What follows from this

the Being of entities. Three; *welt* understood in terms of a place 'wherein' both *Dasein* and *Mit-sein* [entities] are dwelling and occurring. This should be considered as *ontic* situation where entities are located. Four; world, which conceptualize here, is taken in ontological sense of worldhood. This is a *Being* of the situation-in. see, *Sein und Zeit*. pp. 64-65.

20 *ibid*, pp. 83-93.

21 Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translated, introduced and lexicon by Albert Hofstadter. Indiana University Press. Bloomington and Indianapolis. 1988. p. 166. For Heidegger world is an existential of *Dasein*. Many thinkers have considered Heidegger as subjectivist or idealist philosopher due to this view. See the interesting discussion on the issue of subjectivity of the world *ibid*, pp. 162-173. Whereas he claims that his view of the *Dasein's* relation to the world is neither realist nor subjectivist or idealist. **My emphasis.**

22 *Sein und Zeit*, p. 53. We imply from this fact that *in-der-welt-sein* is the part of unitary phenomena *Sein und Zeit*, p53, such as world, *Being-there*, and *Being-in itself*. This point would help us in understanding that *Dasein* is not only intentional of its own being, but also *dialogically intentional* towards entities in the world. Hereto we understand that being of intentionality is *Dasein* which is being in the world. Whereas, traditional subject *fails* to unify the being of subject to the *welt*. in this way, *Dasein's Being* is understands itself in relation to the world.

intentional subjectivity is the *dialogical situation of Dasein* that harbors its essential nature that seems to have been left unexplored by Heidegger's view of *Dasein* as being-there. Thus we would examine this issue in our exposition ahead.

In the philosophy of Heidegger, *Dasein's being* is ontologically different from other entities. In this relation *Dasein* is a *being* who can raise a *question* on its ownmost *Being*. *Dasein's entity* is fundamentally designed to ask questions [Seinsfrage].²³ By raising question *Dasein* is supposed to ask about something [entities, events, Mitsein or Mit Dasein] in the perpetual happenstance of the *world*. This fact would further expound that *Dasein* asks about what it lacks acquaintance with. His lack of acquaintance reflects *Dasein's ignorance* of something to be asked about. So, *Dasein* would ask the question about which he doesn't know.

Asking the question demonstrates the fact of *Being-there* to be unacquainted of what he inquires about. Otherwise, there is no need of asking the question about anything which *Dasein* already knows fundamentally. So, *Dasein* does not question what he already understands in relation to the referential [significance] totality. This existential of *Dasein* empowers him to formulate the basis of questioning.

In this way, *Dasein's questioning* bears a significant turn when he raises questions about something unknown or *Being-forgotten*. Thus inquiry of the basic problems in the history of philosophy must revitalize those issues at hand which, according to Heidegger, have been *forgotten*. Heidegger thinks that human *Dasein* alone has the ability to raise the question on meaning of the *truth of Being* as such. This initial basis of *questionability* inheres in the *Being of Dasein* alone. *Dasein's sense of questionability* is also the precondition of schematizing parameters in constituting the response in content. Thus *Dasein* asks the question in order to ascertain a response. The *question* is only fulfilled when *response* is given successfully. Both the questioner and respondent are supposed to have reached an understanding only through the *dialogical situation*, involving the question and the respondent as *being* the same entity called *Dasein*.

Following this, it appears that phenomena of asking questions would open *Dasein's Being* towards "others" *das Man Selbest* [the They-Self]. *Dasein*, in this sense, demands response from 'das Man' [the They/Other]²⁴ to whom he is supposed to have raised/directed²⁵ questions. Following this, it appears that *other* not only fulfill the question but also satisfy the content of questions by responding successfully. This 'other' also appears to be raising questions in the *dialogical situation*. In this direction, 'other' inspires *Dasein's self* to ask questions and inquire from him in the same way as he does to the *others*. However, 'every other' reshuffles and does not remain the same.

Moreover, the whole activity of questioning/responding²⁶ establishes *reciprocal* relationships between *Dasein* and *Mit Dasein* in the world. Through the activity of questioning/answering *Dasein* establishes its relations with *Mitsein* and *Mit Dasein*. We

²³ *Being and Time*, op cit. p. 21.

²⁴ We have translated *Das Man* as 'The Other', however it generally has been translated as 'the They'.

²⁵ This is phenomenological dimension in *dialogical Dasein*.

²⁶ Question and answer/responding are *dialogical aspects* in *Being and Time*, in particular, and Questionability and answerability both are the *dialogical aspects* in general.

find this relation between *Dasein* and *other Dasein* to be totally ecstatical in the sense that *Dasein* is *Being-towards others* [transcends itself towards other]. In this realm of **dialogical situation**, the phenomenon of *asking questions* shows that *Dasein* not only asks questions from others; but is simultaneously *questioned* by 'Das Man' [the They/Other]. By the same token *Dasein* finds itself directed/inclined towards other; so the others to be directed towards his *self* as *in-der-welt-sein*.

Accordingly, this fact further involves that *Dasein* is an entity which receives and simultaneously projects upon its possibilities. This implies that *Dasein's subjectivity* is not only receptive but also projective due to various possibilities *given* [gaben] in the actual life situation. *Dasein* is, in this way, *in-der-welt-sein* because it/he is totally engaged with *other Dasein's* and *entities*. *Dasein* as *Being-there* is totally *absorbed* with itself and others *meaningfully* through *das in welt*.

In the same context, *Dasein* is the entity which/who has power of *questioning Being*. *Dasein* not only asks about *Being* but he questions the relation between his *Being* and *Being* as such. This way *Dasein* not only asks about *Being* in general, but of *beings* and his own being in particular. Herein, *Dasein* develops the understanding of *Being* as *infinite* and *beings as finite*. The relationships between *infinite* and *finite* develop only into the being that exists ecstatically. This way, *Dasein* is a *finite being* itself. But this is a *paradoxical position* in Heidegger over the conception of *Being* which is infinite and the being who inquires about infinite is itself finite.²⁷ We have gone through this paradox in Heidegger, full of anomalies; in order to further justify the ontological difference between *Being* and being in general, and between human Beings, entities and *Being* as such in particular.

Following this, for Heidegger, it is true of *finite being*, such as *Dasein*, to realize the possibility of its ownmost *Nichtigkeit* [nothingness] in relation to infinite [Being]. By realizing its *Nichtigkeit* *Dasein* would understand its own *finitude* in terms of *death*. It entails that *Dasein's Being* is able to grasp the limitations of its own *Being-possible* [Seinkönnen] *in-der-welt*. *Dasein* understands itself as being finite in terms of possibility of the impossibility of its existence [no more existing *Dasein* after death]. *Death* is the possibility of impossibility of *Dasein's existence* once and for all. It follows that *Dasein* may experience its being through its possibility of *Nichtigkeit* [no-thingness] which is absurd. This fact will lead to the end of *Dasein's historicity* in the sense that no more temporality of *Dasein* is possible. Then how is it possible for an impossible *Dasein* [mortal *Dasein*] either to grasp the *truth* of [infinite] *Being* as such and his ownmost [finite] *Being* in particular. This question remains unresolved in Heidegger.

This phenomenon further exposes *Dasein* as entity who encounters its own *Nichtigkeit* through the way as *anxious being* towards *death* that empowers *Dasein* to encounter its *Alterity* [in the state of continuity and discontinuity]. In this whole process what *Dasein* is entangled to construe is its ownmost existence as *being-possible* [Seinkönnen]. *Dasein* falls back upon itself [its existence] through the muteness and resistance of the other. So, *Dasein* is thrown back upon itself [its ownmost existence] that singles it out

²⁷ See Rintelen J. von Fritz. *Beyond Existentialism*. Trans. Hilda Graef, published by Simson Shand LTD. London, Hertford and Harlow. Particularly read, pp. 17-23.

and expresses the way *Dasein* acts in a very non-transferable way. The muteness and resistance by other not only challenges *Dasein's* I [self] but also keeps it open to the world. *Dasein* is challenged by the others but this challenge inspires *Dasein* to respond them. However, *Dasein* experiences its responsibility in its *existential guilt*. If we take the phenomenon of encounter with [*Dasein's*] *radical alterity* into our account, we would understand the fact that this encounter is not to cease conventional *dialogue* in favor of encounter.

However, this is itself a positive attitude in the phenomena of *dialogue*. This suggests that encounter is the form of *dialogue* which brackets *Dasein's* everyday spatio-temporal consciousness and meanings. In this way, *Dasein* perceives *radical alterity* in its otherness through the event of encounter. In the event of encounter *Dasein* not only experiences *radical alterity* but also sees itself in relation to *das Man Selbst*. *Das Man* brings *Dasein* to a vulnerable position by dominating its all authentic modes of existence. *Dasein's* experience, in the event of encounter is not mediated by language, meaning, thought or a mere significance. This experience of *radical alterity* is immediately due to disruption in the language and meanings.

It appears that *Dasein* is unable to construe this invasion of its experience of *radical alterity* through the disruptions of language and meaning in the events of encounter. When *Dasein* crosses its borders, it/he faces 'other' challenging him by questioning its identity in terms of who he is, because his being is disrupted in the course of *radical alterity*²⁸ in its other. This suggests that 'other' invades the borders of *Dasein's* ownmost self by rendering it [its borders] questionable. For this reason, *Dasein* finds itself no more protected²⁹ due to 'other' invading his borders [self]. *Dasein* is threatened by the intrusion of others in his life world. And *Dasein's* being is challenged by his disclosedness of its death.³⁰ Following this, *Dasein* realizes this challenge which requires him to respond accordingly. Herein, *Dasein* is answerable to the challenge of this 'other'. *Dasein* would respond to the 'other'³¹ in the rise of this challenge.

Nevertheless, *Dasein* will do so by questioning otherness as well in the same context. This otherness itself is questionable before *Dasein* responds to it. As a *first-person* *Dasein* encounters 'other' as adamant to his *Understanding* [Verstehen]. This entails that *Dasein* approaches this 'other' with question seeking an answer [from other] as well. It entails that *Dasein* stands in relation to other on the basis of his innermost ability to *questioning* and *demanding* response and simultaneously be ready for the same. This is how we construe the fact that *Dasein's* subjectivity is *dialogically constituted*.

²⁸ Herein, Radical Alterity is taken in terms of *Dasein's* absolute shift of life-world to an unknown and undetermined world e.g. Death. So, death can be understood as *Dasein's* Radical Alterity and its absolute otherness, Emphasis Added.

²⁹ This phenomena somewhat takes after Derrida's notion of Aporia. Accordingly, it is discussed that *Dasein* not only establishes an uncross-able borders between his own being [self] and its death, but also uncovers the fact that this border is not *Dasein's* eternal refuge. Because *Dasein* is unable to know or experience of his whereabouts after he dies. See, Derrida Jacques *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford University Press. 1996 see particularly pp. 43-90.

³⁰ This disclosedness of *Dasein's* death is truth of death, which *Dasein* is in truth and *Dasein* is truth itself.

³¹ This other is the Call of Conscience, which calls *Dasein* back to its ownmost self.

However, this should not be surprising at all. *Dasein* is a being who exists. In existing, *Dasein* not only questions beings of its own nature but also entities at hand. *Dasein* not only receives responses but also responds to others' queries and questions. This is the everyday structure of *Dasein's being in the world*. *Dasein's everyday existence* is structured through this mutual process of questioning and responding. Therefore, *Dasein* would naturally approach *radical alterity* by questioning and expecting response. The *call of conscience* would question *Dasein* and *Dasein* would also respond to it in return.

Nevertheless, *Dasein* gives no absolute response [to his call of conscience], nor does it find the suitable answer in this *dialogic situation*. *Dasein* would always be facing challenges of unanswered question in this situation. This is the limitation of *Dasein's existence*. The meaning, delivered over to, or deferred through response, given in rise of *Dasein's enquiry*, is totally unsolvable and abstruse one. *Dasein* always remains in the state of uncertainty to ask for what is next after his death. *Dasein's radical otherness* and the divinity of the mortal [as forth fold, Geviert] remain unanswerable till death comes to be actualized through the possible impossibility of *Dasein's existence in the world*.

Dasein never achieve certain response/answer of these queries. He is thrown back upon his ownmost self [being]. This would be considered as the next part of the challenge. In this way, *Dasein* realizes that *muteness of other* challenges him to anticipate his being as *Seinkonnen*. *Dasein* as *being-possible* would either be fleeing in the face of this *truth* or be open to *truth* in terms of *being towards other*. *Dasein* is heavily burdened by responsibility and *guilt*. In this way, *Dasein* turns out to be deficient of any definite foundation. But this does not mean that *Dasein* loses the sense of responsibility altogether. *Dasein* is still a *responsible being* because it is in the existential capacity of *Dasein* to avoid shifting its responsibility to other. So, *Dasein* is not merely responsible to other, but he is responsible to himself and for himself as well. This fact of *Dasein* further entails that being of *Dasein* is [as in-der-welt Seinkonnen] is liberating. *Dasein* is ecstatically open to its *welt* in which he encounters with entities and *dialogically* interacts with one another [Mit *Dasein*] in order to enjoy their existence. In this way, *Dasein's being* is existentially creative, playful and adventurous in terms of *in-der-welt Seinkonnen*.

Finally, we have attempted to relocate the conception of subjectivity through *dialogicality* of *Dasein* in a way which opens *Dasein* up to other [Mitseins and Mit *Dasein*]. If *Dasein's subjectivity dialogically* opens towards *others*, then there remains no more isolated subject as portrayed by idealistic philosopher in the traditional philosophy. This is a great challenge for those thinkers who accentuate the isolation of subject from its world. However, by establishing *dialogical subjectivity of Dasein*, we have simultaneously given up understanding of *dialogue* on the common ground.

Critical review of the preceding perspectives

In our view Heidegger's *Dasein* is the *Being* who is single-most authentic subject independent of other's power over him. However, Heidegger's individual, *single-most person* relates itself through its ownmost *Being* via using public language [language is always public]. This entails that *Dasein's individuality* acts in a very public way

naturally. This public way dealing of *Dasein* pertains to his subjectivity in relation to objectivity e.g. what is out there.

The *call of conscience* involves itself with *Being* of *Dasein* to be back upon its ownmost Being. However, call is shaped through public way of talk which conversely depends upon the language. But the question is that who is the ownmost being and who is the caller? *Dasein's* subjectivity as *Being* towards death and *call of conscience* appear to be two different beings. Thus, *Dasein* splits into two *Beings*; one as a *transcendental subject*, other as *call of conscience*. We may consider that this dualistic aspect of *Being* of *Dasein* can still be conceived as *single-most Being towards its ownmost Being* in the way of *death* and *Being* towards the *world* as a *unity in duality*. This is explainable as a *dialogical self*. In this way, *dialogical subjectivity* is unified subject with two different aspects. One as conscious subject – *Dasein* is conscious of itself as existence and mineness, two, as conscious of its relations to the *other Dasein*, entities and *Being* of all entities in the *world* through the *language, meaning, significance* and *discourse*. Thus, *dialogical Dasein* is a subject that is conscious of itself as *being-towards-other* and *being-towards-itself*, both constituted through a language that moves *Dasein* this way or that way.

Thus, sociality, authenticity and individuality of *Dasein* cannot be segregated from each other. The *social Dasein* is already *authentic Dasein* as *dialogical self*. The *dialogical self* of *Dasein* is engulfed with meanings and referential totalities in relation to other *Dasein* in the *social world*. He acts authentically because he knows that he encounters manifold choices and infinite possibilities with the limitations of actuality. Such a *dialogical self* cannot be devoid of sociality, communality and *dialogical individuality* because of its *Being* essentially associated to a linguistic community where he is **born** [but not thrown].

What follows from this, leads us to the reconstruction of Heidegger's *Dasein* as *dialogical Being* in the *world* to re contemplate the question, meaning and truth of *Being* as existential relationships of the basic mode of *Dasein's* existence in the *world* of significance rather than metaphysical one. Every *Dasein* makes sense of what exists in the *world* as ready to hand or present at hand entities. This sense comes out of the way *Mit Dasein* make meaningful dialogue. *Dasein* acquires real sense of existent beings through the *linguistic world*. This means *Dasein* understands the *world, Being* and *existent beings* through the *dialogue* involving concept that may imply truth or falsehood.

Thus, in our view, *dialogue* and *language* are the existent modes of *Dasein* itself. The idea of an isolated *Dasein* in search of non-linguistic and **BEING** of *beings* in emptiness makes the problem of truth greatly over-handed by the requirement of a terminology that haunts the intellect rather than give any sense of direction. All kinds of *dialogue*, monologues, and metaphysical *dialogues* are indeed *dialogical* through the symmetry of everydayness for *Dasein*. This further implies that *question, meaning* and *truth of Being* is discovered through one *Dasein* making *dialogue* with other *Dasein* [Mit Dasein in der welt].

Thus there seems to be no question of *forgetfulness of Being*, rather one must revisit *Being* as a *dialogically* constructed. In our view, *Dasein* has not forgotten the *Being*, but misconceived the worth of *Being*. In our view Heidegger's idea of *Dasein* seems to be associated with antecedently specific individualistic *self* known in rarity. *Heidegger imports a very rare and uncommon view of subject that cannot be universalized.*

It entails that *dialogical Dasein* is a naturally social *Being* who never exists without its relations to others in the *social world*. So, *Dasein* would never be back upon its ownmost *Being one's self*. For the reason that it [*Dasein*] has not been even to itself without *permeating through the world* which is a dwelling place of *Dasein's Being*. Thus there arises no question about *Dasein* to be back upon itself.

Dasein has always been [in past] *dialogical* and discourse oriented subject, it is even now [in presence] using *language* in order to attain the meaning and significance of the *world* in referential totality. And this will show the *dialogical Being as being* ahead of itself [futuristic self] e.g. *Dasein* would move forward in the world of future *Dasein*. *Dasein* as a *dialogical* subject has been, is and will remain open to its *umwelt* and dwell in the world alongside *Mitsein* and *Mit Dasein*. So, it is essential nature of *Dasein* to be engaged with and involved with the *world*; the *world* which is always and already there where *Dasein* is born.

Dialogical Dasein is shaped through the conventional use of language in the circles of *das Man*. Language is the source of constituting meaning of one's self [subjectivity] in relation to the objectivity [social world]. This way *Dasein* understands itself in relation to other *Dasein* [family members, such as parents, sisters and brothers] in his social world. He constitutes the meaning of his ownmost *Being* by way of blending his innermost realization of one's *self* to his structural whole [social world]. The *dialogical subjectivity* is not empty intentionality or *pure subjectivity*; rather it lives in the home of language as the *hausefreund* [home friend of both *Being* and *Dasein*]. Heidegger is justified in saying that "language is the house of *Being*". *Dasein dwells* in the proximity of *Being*.

Moreover, *Dasein* owns his 'I' through language, so language owns *Dasein* towards meanings and significance. Undoubtedly *Dasein* seems to be in the state of *dialogue* with others in the external *social world*, and with his own other within his ownmost *self*. When *Dasein* interacts with *other Dasein*, he talks, interprets, says something and affirms or denies objects. Here *Dasein's subjectivity* is *dialogically* oriented to entities in the world. When *Dasein* realizes that he is an individual existence among many others, than he hears, understands, and derives himself to his ownmost self e.g. the call of conscience in loneliness [Monologue]. In this way, the *dialogical self* is one who is talker and the listener all at one moment. In other words, the talker and the listener are the same subject in case of *self dialogue commonly conceived as monologue*. *The monologue is actually a dialogue with itself.*

The *monologue* has *dialogical* grounds. A monologue is not *trans-lingual* in any sense. It requires *Dasein's familiarity* with the basic structures of language, meaning and significance in the silent *hearkening* and constituent understanding of whom the caller calls the *Dasein's self* in silence. Therefore, it is unavoidable for the *self* of *Dasein* to

represent his *self* through public discourse and the language. *Dasein* speaks his ownmost self within himself just as he talks to others in the social world. Thus, it proves that human consciousness is not isolated pure *consciousness* of one's *self*. *Dasein's faculty* of consciousness is not disembodied subjectivity; rather it is a dialogical consciousness always directed towards the others, even the self-enclosed consciousness has essentially a *dialogical* ground within itself. Without talking to oneself, one is unable to understand himself. *Self-enclosed consciousness* is subjective and occurs to *self-understanding* on the basis of *Monologism* which again possesses the *dialogical* power. And the *dialogical consciousness* is objective in the sense that it is intentionally directed towards the others in the world. Former position shows *Dasein* to be as a continuous self-direction. And later shows that *Dasein* appears as continuous other-direction. Herein, *Dasein* is split again in to *self-enclosed consciousness* which is subjective and *dialogical consciousness* which is objective. However, both have the equiprimordial foundations into the *dialogical* power of *Dasein* as a *social Being* of a linguistic community. *Dasein* is nothing without language, understanding and discourse. The language is a house of *BEING*, and *Dasein* is the shepherd of *Being* who preserves the *truth of Being*.

Thus, Heidegger seems to be reluctant to expose whatness of *Being* through his text. He raises the *question of Being*, leaves it as his unfinished project, and stands by it without further excavating the *meaning and truth of Being*. Heidegger *fails* to give us *sense and meaning of Being* in real. What lets Heidegger to hide the *truth of Being* which he desired to expose as the essential project of his *philosophy of Being*? Either he got to know *Being* as *nothingness*, or substance beyond every *existence*. Whatever it may be, he did not do justice to the notion of both *Being* in general and *Being of Dasein* in particular. *What he failed to realize is the fact of Dasein to be dialogical self who is able to understand the truth and meaning of Being through the use of Sprach.*

So, Heidegger's goal of *Dasein* to experience the truth of *Being* overlooks the *dialogical power* of *Dasein* through which he could understand the *meaning and truth of Being* on the basis of *language*. What we know in the *world* is *language ridden*. *Language* has the essential ground in the *social world*, so is *Dasein's Being* in the *world*. In this way, *Dasein lives in the proximity of Being via language*. If *Dasein* *frees* from the domination of *das Man*, than he collapses itself of all the *linguistic structure*, and *social attitudes*. On the other side, anxiety related to the *call of conscience* and realization of one's *being towards death* would cease to be meaningful in any *social context*. Following this, all the social structures and meaningful totalities would turn into *nothingness*. ***Being and Time would be relegated to the text of nothingness, rather than Being.*** If there is *no-Being* then all talk of *Being* is *non-sensical*, and *meaningless*. Thus, *language of Being* would turn into *language of nothingness* and *non-existent*. Likewise, death and anxiety equiprimordially lose their significance in the language of *nothingness*. Through this *language of nothingness Being* turns out to be the source of its own *nothingness*.

In order to save philosophy of Being and Being of Dasein, Heidegger's project of Being and Time must be diverted from traditional phenomenology, existential psychology, and philosophy of consciousness to philosophy of dialogue. To set the instance, it is indispensable to work out a project through the philosophy of dialogue in order to blend all these sources of phenomenology, existential psychology and that of philosophy of

consciousness together and compensate the loss of Being and Time. Undoubtedly, Heidegger attempted to save Being for the sake of Being itself. But he failed to justify his project of Being and Time, to release Being in universal way. On the other direction, Dasein's Being is able to revitalize the question of Being Seinfrage, that also could not gain the currency to eliminate this philosophical loss. Following all this discussion, we have reached a point that dialogical Dasein is the only way out to recollect the wealth of Being by the way of language, discourse and dialogue.

Language as the common ground of understanding becomes the primordial source of Dasein's understanding the world he dwells in and exists beside other Dasein intersubjectively. This means that language is fundamental for the understanding the question, meaning and truth of Being in relation to beings. In this sense outsource of all this is the dialogue between persons having familiarity with language as the common ground of their social interaction, communication and meaningful relations in the social world. Even the question of metaphysics itself cannot be detached from the language in the form of dialogue and dialogical structures shaping the existential structure of Dasein as in-der-welt-sein. If Dasein without a language [as isolated subject] raises the question of Being, than this question cannot be raised without a language in the sense of understanding of Being. In this framework we see that the very nature of Dasein is essentially linguistic cum dialogical without which the meaning of Being itself is lost into near awareness of existence irrespective of any understanding.

Accordingly, the dialogical Dasein [self] is more fundamental than any existential aspects of Dasein portrayed by Heidegger in Being and Time. What he failed to consider is the dialogical aspect of Dasein to interact with the world and its own other [monological self] meaningfully. All whatever we have reached the conclusive point of our dissertation, is Dasein is a Being who exists as a dialogical self going through discourse with itself and others [Mit Daseins] in order to discover the metaphysical concept of Being that Being which cannot possibly unconcealed without any language. This proves that language is the primordial source of Being itself known by Dasein in the dialogical world of beings.